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This thesis considers the implications of the Soviet
military presence in Southeast Asia. It shows the inadequacy
of Soviet attempts to build influence in the region through
use of non military means and subsequent Soviet reliance on
military assistance programs and military deployments to gain
influence. The reaction by regional nations and the United
States to the military presence is described. Conclusions
are reached concerning the threat posed by the Soviet military
presence to both regional states and the United States. The
liklihood of a long term Soviet military presence in Indochina
is explored in relation to U.S. and regional security. The
current United States response to the threat is detailed and a
future course of action is suggested.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis will examine the implications of the Soviet
military activities in Southeast Asia. It demonstrates the
inadequacy of the USSR's non-military means of gaining
influence; describes the Soviet military buildup and
military assistance programs in the area; shows the reaction
to the growth of the Soviet regional presence by the states
in the area; measures the impact on the United States
position in Southeast Asia; and explains the implications of
the Soviet reliance on military power as tool of foreign
policy
.
The Soviets encounter many problems when they attempt to
gain regional influence. If they wish to be successful in
furthering their national interests these problems must be
solved. Mohmed Heikal, from his view point after many years
of first hand dealings with the USSR from a third world
point of view, identifies four problems the Soviets face in
dealing with smaller nations [Ref. 2: p. 278]. First, the
Soviets are generally unable to fully comprehend the nature
of the nationalist movements in those states. Rather than
recognizing nationalism as a very powerful force which will
inevitably run its own course, they tend to see it as a
means by which the proletariat can advance the cause of the
For a detailed examination of the process of influence
building see Ref. 1.
socialist revolution, denying any other possible outcomes
(i.e. nationalist movements resulting in stable capitalist
democracies )
.
Second, the Soviets are largely unable to cope with their
own dichotomous nature as a leader of world revolution on the
one hand and a status quo conscious super power on the other.
Conflict is welcomed where it weakens the hand of the West
and presents opportunities for Soviet advances . Moscow
criticizes departures from preferred norms . For example , it
is one thing for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) to
further the case of the socialist revolution in Kampuchea
and quite another for it to deviate from the Soviet economic
model
.
A third basic problem the Soviets face when they attempt
to gain influence in other nations is the rigidity of Soviet
institutions. This creates an inability to pursue alternate
avenues when the initial movement is curtailed or blocked by
unforseen problems . Heikal says that in most third world
countries there is a strong leader who can manage to push
programs forward in spite of bureaucratic problems . In
dealing with the USSR this is not the case, and the third
world leaders give up on the "creaking bureaucracy" of the
Soviets
.
Finally, the Soviet leadership tends to reflect the
rigidity of the overall Soviet system, causing leaders of
smaller nations to complain of an "impression of frozen
immobility" in Soviet ability to deal with current problems
on anything other than their own terms. In short, because
of the logevity of Soviet foreign policy functionaries such
as Gromyko and Brezhnev, the third world leader can never
hope for a better deal after the next Soviet "election" . He
must deal with the same personalities for seemingly endless
periods of time.
Thus, before they get started, the Soviets have a
disadvantageous load of baggage which they carry into the
international arena where they want to achieve their national
interest through influence building. These disadvantages,
along with problems specific to Southeast Asia listed later,
affect Soviet attempts to gain regional influence. They also
partially explain why the Soviets rely so much on military
means to reach their goals.
The remainder of this thesis examines the implications
of Soviet regional military activity in five chapters . The
first looks at Soviet foreign policy goals in the region and
the means of attaining those goals. The second list the
present and future capabilities of the Soviet military in the
region. The third is an overview of the perceptions of
regional actors towards Soviet activities in the area. The
fourth assesses implications for the U.S. of Soviet activity
in Southeast Asia. Finally, conclusions are drawn from the
body of the thesis concerning Soviet regional successes and
failures and the long range implications for the United
2States.
2
For a detailed framework for the examination of Soviet
foreign policy see Ref. 3.
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II. THE SOVIET UNION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Prior to 1978 Soviet power and influence in Southeast
Asia were not very strong. Only since 1978 have the Soviets
found themselves in a position in Southeast Asia were they
are able to consider serious actions to move toward the
attainment of regional and related global goals. A push by
the Soviets to increase power and build influence begain late
that year with a Soviet naval buildup in the theater. The
buildup provided moral backing to the Vietnamese who were at
war with the Chinese. This short war between two former
allies who had throughout the Vietnam war been described by
the old Chinese adage as "close as the lips to the teeth",
opened the door for a larger Soviet presence which will be
detailed in depth below [Ref. 9: p. 63.].
A. SOVIET GOALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
In the traditional ideological sense, the ultimate goal
of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia is to advance the cause
of world communism through revolution. Indeed,
For the purposes of this thesis the term Southeast Asia
denotes the ASEAN states and Indochina.
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Though the need for some degree of cooperation is admitted,
the Kremlin still exudes bellicosity and invective when re-
ferring to capitalism. The basic legitimacy of non-Commu-
nist regimes is still not accepted. In the Soviet view, no
'capitalist government' has a moral right to exist.
Ultimately, they will all be replaced by regimes truly
representing the 'working people' [Ref. 16: p. 116].
But, ideology is clearly not the overriding factor in
Soviet relations with Southeast Asia. This is true even
though Moscow continually espouses the victory of Marxist-
Leninist theories in the international system (which change
according to the needs of the current group in power in the
Kremlin). The leaders of the Soviet Union are more pragmatic,
dealing in foreign policy much like other great powers
,
focusing on the national interests of the Soviet Union in
relation to power, security, prestige, and the USSR's relation
to the United States and China [Ref. 16: p. 124.].
To purse their national interests , the Soviet Union has
four main goals in Southeast Asia. These are: 1. Containing
of the Peoples Republic of China (PRO economically,
ideologically, and militarily. 2. Countering U.S. influence
in the area, especially to weaken American power and separate
the United States from friendly countries in the region to
shift the global balance of power toward the Soviet Union.
3. Keeping the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN,
currently made up of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore,
Philippines, and Brunei) from becoming overtly pro-Western
with security arrangements with the U.S. or the PRC. 4.
Supporting the pro-Soviet states in the region and increasing
their dependence on the USSR [Ref. 19: p. 154.].
12
Are the Soviets able to build influence and attain their
goals through the use of diplomacy, economic interaction and
military presence? Yes and no.
B. THE CURRENT POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA
After 1978, the USSR showed a greater interest in South-
east Asia. They sensed that following the U.S. departure from
the area they would be able to gain much more influence there
.
Beginning with the summer of 1978, a marked change in Moscow's
attitude toward Southeast Asia in general and ASEAN in
particular occurred. Moscow Radio and the Soviet press took
favorable positions towards ASEAN and stressed the lasting
nature of the continuing conflicts between ASEAN states and
Beijing [Ref. 25: pp 65-66]. The Soviets were attempting to
show respect for ASEAN by stating that they were not the
source of support for Southeast Asian communist insurgency
movements by placing the blame on the PRC.
The USSR also took steps in mid-1978 to solidify its
relations with the SRV
,
granting it full membership in the
Soviet-bloc economic group, COMECON. In November of that year,
the USSR and the SRV concluded a treaty of friendship and
cooperation. The USSR hoped that this 25 year treaty would
further signal to the nations of Southeast Asia its committ-
ment to diplomatic dealings in the area and serve as an
13
indicator of Moscow's opposition to Beijing's diplomatic
efforts in Kampuchea [Ref. 26: p. 112.]. This series of
diplomatic offensives suffered a blow later in 1978 when the
SRV invaded Kampuchea. The USSR was in the position of
supporting a regional aggressor, one that frightened the
members of ASEAN as much as the PRC
.
The Soviets are cross-pressured in Southeast Asia. On
the one hand their relation with Vietnam has given them
a major client with the strongest military capabilities
in the region whose strategic location provides access
to unprecedented regional naval and air facilities for
a growing Soviet Pacific Fleet. On the other hand,
Moscow's economic underwriting of Hanoi's occupation
of Cambodia obstructs Soviet efforts to establish cor-
dial ties with the ASEAN states and serves to enhance
the orientation of the latter toward the U.S. and China
[Ref. 27: p. 304. ]
.
There has been little improvement in Soviet relations
with the nations of Southeast Asia since the invasion.
Moscow's attitude toward ASEAN remains basically friendly
and Soviet authors such as I.I. Kovalenko , a noted writer on
Asian affairs, emphasize the strategic importance of the
region [Ref. 25: p. 55]. The continuing Soviet support for
the SRV presence in Kampuchea, however, has not let the
relationship between the USSR and ASEAN prosper.
Also, Moscow's signals to the area are mixed. For
example, in 198 3, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail
Kapista, commenting on the alleged Thai support to Kampuchean
resistance forces, said that Vietnam would begin supplying
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arms to insurgents in Thailand and other ASEAN states if they
did not cease their support of the Kampuchean resistance
forces [Ref 28: p. 318]. At the same time, the First
Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi released a statement
declaring that the USSR wanted relations between the SRV and
ASEAN to improve [Ref 29: p. 18]. The Southeast Asians are
distrustful of this doublespeak approach and the Soviet
position in Southeast Asia, excluding Indochina, continues to
be weak.
C. THE INADEQUACY OF SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO BUILD INFLUENCE
In an effort to build influence and achieve their goals
in Southeast Asia, the Soviets pursue four steps. First,
they claim that their political/ideological and economic
system is the best road for regional development. Second
they supply aid and military assistance. Third they sign
military alliances with various states in Southeast Asia.
Fourth, they maintain a seemingly permanent military deploy-
ment in Indochina. A brief examination of the two major areas
of involvement prior to 1978, Indonesia and Vietnam, indicates
that their present efforts in these areas are based on an
uncertain background
.
1 . Past Inadequacies
Soviet efforts at gaining a foothold, in Southeast Asia
through involvement in Indonesia shows that concentrated
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efforts may not pay off in the long term. Soviet-Indonesian
relations were cordial from 1954-1965 as the Soviets
identified with the anticolonial and anti-imperialist strains
in President Sukarno's foreign policy. Indeed, the Soviets
gave over one billion dollars worth of military aid to the
Indonesians in the early 1960's. This aid was responsible
for a large scale upgrade of the Indonesian armed forces.
Equipment provided included major surface and patrol
combatants , medium range bombers and fighters , and large
amounts of weapons for ground forces [Ref. 10: pp. 415-427].
The USSR hoped this aid would build lasting ties between the
Indonesian and Soviet military leadership. However, potential
Soviet gains were never fully realized because of suspected
communist involvement in the abortive left wing coup of
September 30, 1965 [Ref. 10: pp. 271-275].
Whether or not the Soviets were responsible for the coup
in Indonesia, one of the consequences was that large scale
military assistance was stopped. Even if the Soviets were
not involved in the coup , and they probably were not , the
newly powerful right wing of the Indonesian military felt they
were guilty by association. The military saw all communists
as revolutionaries, and therfore evil. At the same time Soviet
leadership which came to power after the fall of Krushchev
concluded that the massive amounts of aid to Indonesia reaped
no benefits. After all, the Indonesian military killed
hundreds of thousands of suspected communists after the coup
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attempt; hardly the act of a grateful nation! The feeling of
Indonesian suspicion and Soviet disappointment over lack of
gain for their efforts joined to ruin the relationship. Since
that time, relations between the nations have been correct but
less than enthusiastic.
The other example of Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia
prior to 1978 was in Vietnam. Extensive documentation shows
that the Soviet Union was (along with the PRO one of the two
main suppliers of military and economic aid to North Vietnam
in its war against South Vietnam. Were it not for Soviet aid,
especially after the curtailment of aid from the PRC late in
the war, the North would not have been able to mount a large
scale conventional invasion of South Vietnam in the spring of
1975. The Soviet Union was obviously heavily involved in the
Vietnam conflict. In the pre-1969 era (before the announce-
ment of the Nixon doctrine) the main goal of the USSR in
Southeast Asia was to see the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
the area. The USSR hoped that aid to the North Vietnamese
would allow more opportunity for an increase in Soviet
influence in the region and hurt the U.S. at the same time
[Ref. 11: p. 337].
An examination of Soviet activity in the SRV in 1975
indicates that the effort was not paying off. There were no
formal economic ties ; Soviet Navy units made no port visits
to the SRV; there was no formal treaty of cooperation between
17
the two nations; and there were indications that the SRV
wanted and would get a normalization of relations with the
U.S. (in hope of economic aid).
What had happened along the way to short circuit these
Soviet efforts? The fact is that prior to late 1978 the
Soviets were not anxious to see a strong, unified Vietnam
which could displace it as the important regional socialist
actor. Also, the Vietnamese were skeptical of the depth of
Soviet committment to their nation. Three examples chosen
after 1964 serve to show why this is true. First, in 1964
and again in 1965, Krushchev and Kosygin each proposed a
negotiated settlement to the conflict in Indochina. Further-
more, Kosygin went so far as to pressure the North Vietnamese
to accept President Johnson's precondition that the North
cease supplying military aid to the guerillas in the South.
After initial approval of the Moscow initiative, the North
disavowed the Soviet diplomatic move [Ref. 11: pp. 336-337].
Second, the Soviets never regarded the war in Vietnam
and U.S. bombing of the North (even when Kosygin was in Hanoi)
as fatal to the process of detente. Rather, they welcomed
President Nixon to Moscow in spite of the fact that he was
Hanoi's number one enemy, and a far as possible (in light of
PRC efforts to increase its influence in the North) pressured
the leaders of the North to toe the line of detente [Ref 11:
p. 337].
2 . Present Inadequacies
The situation prior to 1978 shows that the USSR did not
gain a great deal of influence in Indonesia and North Vietnam,
despite its efforts in the political, economic and military
arenas. Since 1978 the USSR has not had much success in the
region outside of Indochina. The USSR has failed to impress
any of the members of ASEAN that it is best example of social
development or that it has the potential to be a strong ally.
In fact it has often done itself tremendous harm in the way it
acted and conducted business. The Leninist ideology has
little appeal because these nations have already experienced
their national revolutions and established long lasting,
viable polities which do not need to turn to the USSR for
social guidance or economic aid.
With the exception of the very large role that it plays in
the SRV, Laos and Kampuchea, the amount of trade conducted
between Southeast Asian nations and the USSR is minuscule.
Imports of Soviet goods amount to only a fraction of total
imports by ASEAN nations and have not exceeded .5% within the
past decade while exports to the USSR have not exceeded 4% (at
the same time the average for ASEAN countries with the United
States for 1979 was 18.6% for exports and 16.5% for improts
[Ref. 21: p. 24]). On the other hand, the figures for trade
between Vietnam and the USSR have run approximately 40% in
19
exports and imports [Ref. 20: p. 206]. In short, it doesn't
seem that the technocrats who actually determine economic
policy in the ASEAN countries have found much to draw them to
the Soviet Union.
At the same time, the political leaders of these countries
are continually reminded of the heavy handed manner in which
the Soviet political system works. This acts as a repellent
against Soviet influence. The actions the Soviets took in
Afghanistan and the KAL 00 7 shoot down and, most importantly,
their support for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, are
among only the most internationally visible incidents which
tarnish the Russian image. As an example of how these actions
harm Soviet standings in the area, one only has to look at
Singapore, the smallest country in the region. In 1980 it
terminated an agreement with the USSR to repair Soviet naval
units at Singaporean shipyards because of the invasions of
Kampuchea and Afghanistan [Ref. 22: p. 137]. (This did not
create a hardship on Singapore as the Soviet portion of all
ship repairs in 1978, for example, were less than 10% [Ref. 23:
p. 5 39]). In short, the members of ASEAN have found little
to attract them to the Soviet Union.
This lack of attraction would appear to be true in
Southeast Asia only as far as the ASEAN is concerned. On the
surface, the economic and diplomatic relations between the
Soviets and the countries of Indochina would seem to be good.
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Indeed, Soviet economic aid to the SRV is currently running
at approximately 700 million dollars a year with another 200
million going to Laos and Kampuchea. There are also
approximately 7,000 economic advisors in place in Indochina
[Ref. 32: p. 6]. Indochinese economic dependence on the
Soviets is nearly total.
This is only the most superficial view of the real
relationship between Indochina and the USSR. The true
picture is not so bright. There are instances where the
Vietnamese have chafed under both the economic dominance and
political arrogance of the Soviets. The Soviets publicly
criticize the Vietnamese for their poor economic acumen and
bureaucratic corruption. This displeases the Vietnamese. In
fact, the situation in Vietnam is so bad that visitors to
that country have been frequently insulted (and even murdered)
when they have been mistaken for Russians [Ref. 13: p. 257].
Furthermore, the tenuous base of the diplomatic relations
between the two countries was exposed when Hanoi engineered
the downfall of Kampuchean leader Pen Sovan in 19 81 because
he adhered too closely to the desires of the Soviet Union
[Ref. 32: p. 6].
Another area where the SRV and their Soviet benefactors
have not seen eye to eye is in the manner in which the SRV
has handled the military operations in Kampuchea. The
Soviets have not been reluctant to criticize the SRV for
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their failure to gain control of the Kampuchean countryside
following the 1979 invasion [Ref. 57: p. 40]. Finally,
there is a faction within the SRV ruling communist party
which criticizes the amount of political dependence the USSR
has tried to impose on the SRV as a result of growing
economic and military dependence [Ref. 11: p. 347].
At the same time, the Soviets are widely disliked on a
personal level throughout the region. The best summation of
this dislike in both countries as advanced as Singapore and
as backward (economically) as Laos, is offered by Seweryn
Bialer
.
Soviet cultural patterns are highly formalized, rigid,
stolid, intolerant, and strange to an amazing variety
of people of various classes and nations who are
exposed to them. The Soviet style of life was said
maliciously by one foreign leader to combine 'the charm
and lightness of the Germans, the openness of the
Albanians, the humility of the Indians, and the
efficiency of the Latins.' Far from being the carrier
of a culture which would enhance any attempts to gain
influence, the Soviet people, including the elite,
exhibit in their unofficial behavior tremendous
attraction to the American style and Western culture.
This ambivalence gives to Soviet cultural behavior a
poorly concealed feeling of superiority in relations
with the poor and 'backward' and a feeling of
inferiority in their relations with the rich and
'developed', that is, the Western. Neither is
attractive, and niether serves their foreign policy
[Ref. 24: p. 260].
The Soviet image is economically, diplomatically and
culturally inadequate throughout the region. The conclusion
is that the only really usable tool for the Soviets to gain
regional influence is that of military assistance for its
allies and the projection of its own military power into
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Southeast Asia. The one area the Soviets can point to
where they have competed successfully with the West is in
that of military might. No one can deny Soviet strategic
parity with the West. Additionally, Soviet arms and military
assistance (even if provided via Cuba) were successful in a
number of third world conflicts such as Angola, Ethiopia, etc.
within the last decade. These facts must be taken into
consideration by both communist and non-communist governments
throughout Southeast Asia. In fact, Soviet military
assistance to Indochina, approximately one billion dollars a
year [Ref, 32: p. 4], allows the Vietnamese to continue
their activities in Kampuchea as well as guard against
Chinese adventurism and maintain a sizeable force in Laos
.
The picture which emerges is one of imbalance of Soviet
policy resources, with military resources as the chief
asset and all other resources playing at most a
supportive role [Ref. 24: p. 256].
It is easy to see why the Soviets must rely on military
assets to build influence and achieve their goals in
Southeast Asia. They simply do not have the diplomatic and
economic "kit bag" to allow any significant, lasting inroads
in the area. Rather, they fall back to the more comfortable
position of military assistance and deployment of Soviet
armed forces to compensate for their political and economic
inadequacy [Ref. 31: p. 76]. The role of the Soviet
military and military assistance in Southeast Asia is to
build influence to achieve regional and global goals. A close
23
look at this role revelas the Soviet military is important
in influence building and goals attainment. Whether or not
these efforts will lead to lasting regional influence and
goal achievement is open to question.
III. PRESENT AND FUTURE ROLE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY
In sum, the Soviets have not been very successful
politically in East Asia, having shown little
flexibility towards China, Japan or ASEAN. They
are trying to compensate for their political
failure with a military buildup that is proceeding
continuously. They are building up and modernizing
their navy and ground forces steadily [Ref. 31:
p. 76].
We have seen why the Soviet Union is relying primarily
on military assests to build influence and achieve their
four basic goals in Southeast Asia. A brief examination of
Soviet military assistance and ground forces presence will
be followed by a closer look at the main military instrument
for achieving Soviet foreign policy goals in Southeast Asia;
the Soviet Navy.
A. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND GROUND FORCES
The total amount of Soviet military aid to Indochina runs
to nearly a billion dollars a year, with the majority going
to the SRV. This continues a pattern established as early as
1955 when the USSR gave approximately 300 million dollars in
military aid to North Vietnam. The figures remained between
2U
300-500 million yearly until 1975. By 1978 the amount had
greatly increase and, while hard to quantify exactly, has
reportedly doubled. Additionally, the USSR also gives
approximately 100 million dollars a year to Laos and
Kampuchea [Ref . 32: p. 4].
Money and arms are not the only things that the Soviets
send to Indochina. The USSR constructed facilities in the
SRV to allow intelligence collection from ground sites most
likely targeted at the southern PRC and U.S. bases in the
Philippines. Additionally, best estimates are that the USSR
has approximately 7,000 ground forces in the SRV, 900 in
Kampuchea, and 500 in Laos. These are all probably acting as
advisors to the military forces of those countries [Ref. 33:
p. 19]. In fact, a Vietnamese army officer captured by the
Thais in 1992 reported that there were Soviet military and
political advisors in all Vietnamese battalions [Ref. 34:
p. 16]. Thai sources [Ref. 35: p. J3] claim that these
advisors train communists insurgents in Laos for operations
in Thailand. Finally, high level Soveit military delegations
frequently travel to Indochina to show solidarity with their
client states [Ref. 36].
In short, military assistance and advisors are important
to strengthening the Soviet position in Indochina. The Soviet
assistance to the Indochinese helps the USSR strengthen its
military position in Southeast Asia. It can be argued that
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the military assistance given to the SRV has been used as the
necessary carrot to allow the Soviets to establish their
increased naval presence in the SRV. This presence for the
first time directly enhances the strategic position of the
USSR in Southeast Asia by challenging U.S. control of the
South China Sea and its approaches.
In the same vein, these attempts at influence building
directly aid the attainment of three of the four basic Soviet
foreign policy goals in the region. First, the aid and
advisors build up the strength of the Indochinese military
forces allowing them to resist Chinese attempts to reach
military solutions to problems such as border disputes
.
Second, the aid and advisors also made the SRV invasion of
Kampuchea possible. This stopped efforts by the U.S. to
enhance its influence in Indochina through normalization of
relations with the SRV. Third, it has made the Indochinese
dependent on the Soviets as their only reliable source of
military hardware.
The goal that is not clearly furthered by these two forms
of military involvement in Indochina is the attempt to
prevent closer ASEAN (or member states) alignment with the
West. In fact, most ASEAN nations maintain direct security
links with Western nations through the Manila Pact (1954
pact against communist aggression signed by the U.S., U.K.,
France, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and
26
Pakistan) or the Five Power Defense Arrangements (1971
agreements to formalized U.K. Australian and New Zealand
participation in the defense of Malaysia and Singapore).
The Soviet military response in Southeast Asia is unlike
other regions where the Soviet military has become so
important (such as Eastern Europe or Afghanistan),
necessitating a departure from the traditional Soviet
dependence on ground forces to match the strength of their
potential rivals. The physical distance from the Soviet
Union, the lack of any common borders, and the fact that the
Vietnamese army already has more than a million regulars,
have dictated that the preponderance of Soviet military
involvement in the region be naval. This would be true in
times of peace and times of war. As Admiral of the Fleet of
the Soviet Union, Sergei Gorshkov has said,
The seas belong to no one, and therefore navies do not
encounter in their operations many of the restrictions
that, in peacetime, hinder the use of other branches
of the armed forces in pursuit of political goals .
In present day conditions , navies have acquired
a special importance in the respect as a result
of the growth of their striking power. The
mobility of a navy, and its flexibility when
limited military conflicts are imminent, enable
it to exert and influence on littoral countries
,
and to apply and advertise a military threat at
any level, beginning with a demonstration of
military force and ending with an amphibious
landing [Ref. 17: p. 302],
27
B. THE SOVIET NAVY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Although Admiral Gorshkov makes a strong argument
(especially in the eyes of another naval officer) about the
importance of the role of the navy in peacetime and conflict,
the role of the navy in Soviet history has not always been as
prominent as it is today. In fact there have been occasions
when the Soviet Navy has fallen on hard times . It has only
been the long term development of the Soviet Navy which has
allowed it to come to the fore in Southeast Asia. Twenty
years ago the Soviet Navy, by its very nature, could not
have been a major tool of Soviet foreign policy in Southeast
Asia.
The Soviet Navy has developed rapidly into a force that
now poses a significant threat in Southeast Asia. It is
capable of conducting operations which are advantageous to
the USSR at great distances away from the homeland. The new
roles of the navy include an emphasis on anti-submarine
warfare (with the intention of protecting Soviet SSBNs from
American attack submarines), expanded sea denial, and a
guaranteed second strike capability in the form of a large
number of SSBNs. All three of these roles pose major threats
to U. S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT) units. Perhaps the most
noteworthy is the emphasis on creating a "no man's sea"




great distances from the homeland where neither side would
be in control of the sea. It is in this area that the greatly
expanded SOVPACFLT would begin to challenge the U.S. in
Southeast Asia in the late 1970' s.
In pursuit of Soviet foreign policy goals in Southeast
Asia, the peacetime roles of the Soviet Navy are: strategic
and local deterrence; preparation for war; and the protection
and promotion of Soviet overseas peacetime interents . The
war fighting roles are: strategic nuclear strike; destruction
of enemy naval forces; control of the seas (in areas of Soviet
national interest); interdiction of enemy sea lines of
communication; amphibious warfare; and at-sea replenishment
of naval forces [Ref. 39: p. 70].
These roles are amply demonstrated by SOVPACFLT through
its SSBN patrols in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Northern
Pacific, a continued buildup in force structure, and forward
deployment and port visits of SOVPACFLT forces throughout
the Pacific theater. With the exception of strategic
nuclear strike and deterrence, the peacetime and warfighting
roles of the Soviet Navy are closely related to attempts to
build influence and the overall goals of the Soviet Union in
Southeast Asia. Realizing that the Soviet Navy is the
primary threat to U.S. (and regional security) in Southeast
Asia, it is necassary to examine in depth the recent buildup
of Soviet naval forces in the area.
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C. THE SOVIET NAVAL BUILDBUP IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The rapid expansion and capabilities of SOVPACFLT,
headquartered at Vladivostok, allows the USSR to greatly
increase its naval strength in Southeast Asia. A tremendous
growth pattern is evident in SOVPACFLT over the past fifteen
years which results in the capability for SOVPACFLT to keep
a sizeable number of units in Southeast Asia. This buildup
is shown below.
TABLE 1
SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET FORCE LEVELS
(This table is compiled from Refs 39, 40, and 41.)
1968 1973 1979 1983
Submarines- 100 101 113 122
Major Surface Combatants ** 58 58 67 88
Minor Surface Combatants NA 135 113 175
Amphibious Ships*** NA 18 18 22
Mine Warfare Craft NA NA 110 100
Auxiliary/Support Ships**** NA NA 225 215
Aircraft***** NA NA 35 5 42 5
NA = Not Available
* Includes all submarines
.
** Includes cruisers, destroyers, and frigates.
*** Includes medium and tank landing ships only.
"""" Includes a wide variety of ships.
***** Includes strike bombers, tactical support, antisubmarine,
and transport and training aircraft. Especially important are
the approximately 40 Naval Backfire aircraft equipped with
air-to-surface missiles.
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Even though this buildup began in the late sixties, it
was not until the Chinese invasion of the SRV in early 1979
that SOVPACFLT established a permanent presence in Southeast
Asia. The combination of the increasing size of SOVPACFLT
and the opportunity for the Soviets to support the Vietnamese
against the PRC, provided the perfect chance for starting a
permanent Soviet naval presence in Southeast Asia. That
permanent presence was presaged by large scale support for
the SRV during the 1978 Chinese invasion. A task force of
approximately 30 ships was assembled in the South China Sea,
extensive reconnaissance flights were flown from SRV
airfields by Bear D aircraft, an extensive air and sea lift of
military supplies for the SRV was conducted, and SOVPACFLT
units made port visits to major SRV ports, increasing the
risk to the Chinese if they had decided to bomb those ports
[Ref, 22: pp. 138-140].
Unfortunately for the United States, this came after the
U.S. debacle in Vietnam had eroded ASEAN confidence in the
ability of America to support its allies in the area and was
followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which led
some observers to further question the ability of the United
States to counter potential Soviet expansionism [Ref. 27:
p. 307].
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In 1979, SOVPACFLT began to operate out of the ex-U.S.
naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh
City as well as Haiphong. In fact, 1979 marked the first
time since Vietnamese independence from the French that the
Soviet Navy had used or visited Vietnamese ports. In 1979 a
total of 79 SOVPACFLT unit visits were conducted resulting
in a total of 731 days spent in port, rising rapidly in 1980
to 143 visits ofr 2135 days, including the first visit of a
Soviet aircraft carrier (Minsk) [Ref. 22: p. 210-211]. As
will be seen, the level of usage continues to increase and
other significant developments have taken place.
Although unconfirmed by U.S. intelligence sources, in
early 1982 the Secretary General of the National Security
Council of Thailand, Squadron Leader Prason Sunsri , announced
that the Soviet Union had begun construction on a deep water
port at the Kampuchean naval facility at Ream (the same
facility destroyed by the U.S. Navy during the Mayaguez
incident) early in the year [Ref. 42: p. 24]. This would,
of course, allow the Soviets to end complete reliance on the
SRV for permanent naval facilities on the South China sea.
Even more ominous for the United States, was the late
1983 announcement by the Commander-in-Chief of United States
Forces Pacific, Admiral William Crowe, that TU-16 Badger
aircraft were operating from the airfield at Cam Ranh Bay.
Additionally, he revealed that approximately 22 Soviet
warships were using Cam Ranh on a daily basis reflecting a
threefold increase since 1980 (resulting in 8030 ship days
for Cam Ranh Bay alone)
. In total then the current force in
the Cam Ranh area would look like this:
TABLE 2
SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE SRV
This table is compiled using
information from Refs 43 and 44.
Submarines $ 2-4
Surface combatants - 4-6
Support Ships + 10-12
TU-95/142 # Probably 4-6
TU-16 % 10
$ Includes at least one submarine equipped with surface-to
surface missiles, most likely an E-II .
" While the exact make up of the types of ships comprising
this group has not been revealed, it is known that Kiev CVHG
Minsk as well as other first line SOVPACFLT combatants have
called at Cam Ranh Bay and it must be assumed that the




amphibious warfare capable units
.
+ No further information is available but one would assume at
the very least a submarine tender and replenishment ships
would be included.
# The exact numbers of Bear aircraft (D models for
reconnaissance and intelligence collection and F models for
anti-submarine warfare and ocean surveillance) has not been
indicated, but standard Soviet practice is to deploy these
units in pairs (i.e. two TU-95's and two TU-142's).
% The number of TU-16 's constitutes one half of a standard
Badger regiment [Ref. 45: p. 437] and is known to include
reconnaissance and strike aircraft, the latter capable of
carrying air-to-surface missiles and probably tanker aircraft
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D. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE
SOVPACFLT has established a force on the South China Sea
littoral which represents a capability to conduct several
types of warfare and carry out the peacetime and wartime
roles of the Soviet Navy listed earlier. The use of Soviet
Navy units during the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1978
should show that the Chinese must take the continuous Soviet
naval presence in the SRV seriously. That force, strengthened
since 1978, can rapidly be brought to bear against southern
China in the event of any further Sino-Vietnamese conflicts
or in the event of a Sino-Soviet confrontation elsewhere.
Additionally, the Soviet Navy units operating in the South
China Sea are a direct threat to Chinese South Fleet units
which conduct routine operations in the same waters. Finally,
if the PRC were to take an aggressive stance against any ASEAN
country, (or was perceived to be taking such a stance) it is
possible that the target country could turn to the USSR and
its fleet for protection.
Also, only since 1978 have the Soviets been able to
deploy surface, subsurface and air assets for long periods
of time to the South China Sea to counter U.S. military
power in the region. (See Chapter V, Section C. for details.)
In direct correlation to attainment of goals, SOVPACFLT
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forces in Southeast Asia are positioned to quickly strike
the southern portion of the PRC if a conflict with the
Chinese should occur-, they are directly opposite the U.S.
bases in the Phillipines and sit nearly astride U.S. lines
of communication and supply to the Indian Ocean; they could
be easily employed against any member of ASEAN if any of
those states joined the PRC in a move against Indochina; and
finally, they can be used to support the Soviet client states
in Indochina if they are been threatened by the PRC.
Recent actions by the USSR in Southeast Asia indicate
that SOVPACFLT will continue to be the focal point of Soviet
attempts to attain their regional foreign policy goals well
into the future. We next turn to what the future composition
of Soviet military forces may be in Southeast Asia.
E. FUTURE COMPOSITION OF SOVIET FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
It appears that the level of Soviet military assistance
and ground forces advisors to the SRV will be maintained at
its current levels in the near future. There have been no
indications , such as forward deployment of airborne troops
or Soviet Air Forces strategic assets, that any larger role
for Soviet ground forces is likely. This does not rule out
the capability of the Soviets, upon request of the SRV, to
introduce those types of forces in to the area if the SRV
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feels they are necessary for protection. In the future, the
largest military presence that the USSR places in the region
will remain SOVPACFLT.
Since I have concluded the Soviet naval buildup in
Southeast Asia marks the most important effort of the USSR
to attain its regional goals, the remaining question is:
What form will the challenge assume in the future? It is
clear that the position of SOVPACFLT in Southeast Asia is
going to be further strengthened qualitatively. Also, the
size of SOVPACFLT will probably continue to grow slowly with
more modern and capable units being added at aperiodic
intervals. Indeed, SOVPACFLT has recently added another
aircraft carier, Kiev class CVHG Novorossiysk
,
to its order
of battle as well as an Ivan Rogov class LPD . This task
force, which was recently deployed to the Indian Ocean,
entered the Strait of Malacca on 13 February, bound for the
Pacific Fleet, [Ref . 46: p. 8] arriving at its new base in
late February or early March [Ref. 52: Part I p. 9]. The
arrival of this second carrier to the Pacific Fleet has
already caused regional governments to view its potential as
a "force multiplier" and a "genuine cause for concern" among
the ASEAN states [Ref. 56: p. 8].
At the same time a shift in the emphasis of the
capabilities of newly constructed ships for the Soviet Navy
is on going. Before 1976, new surface units introduced into
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the navy were almost exclusively ASW oriented. Now,
however, the Soviets are building units such as the Kiev
class aircraft carriers, Kirov class nuclear powered cruiser,
the Slava class guided missile cruiser, the Sovremennyy class
guided missile destroyer, and the Ivan Rogov class amphibious
assault transport dock. These units are much more capable
than previous Soviet ships. They give the Soviets the ability
to mount a bigger challenge to the U.S. and other navies which
operate in the Southeast Asian region. Even though only two
of these classes have operated in the South China Sea, past
patterns of Soviet Pacific Fleet development shows that the
other units will be operating in the area in the not too
distant future. To cause even greater concern, the Soviets
are currently building a new class of larger conventional
take off and landing nuclear powered carrier. Using the
Kiev class deployment pattern as a guide, it is logical that
the second of these units (available early in the next
decade) would be transferred to SOVPACFLT [Ref. "49: p. 31].
Finally, it is clear that these new types of ships are
coupled with a willingness of the Soviets to deploy their
forces more frequently and keep them at sea for longer
periods of time. The number of cumulative days that SOVPACFLT
units have been at sea in a given year in the Pacific
theater (excluding the Indian Ocean) rose from 4,200 in 19.68,
to 11,800 in 1980, nearly a 300% increase [Ref 22: p. 183].
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And, as we have seen (in Table 2.), the use of the ports in
the SRV has greatly expanded since 1980, driving the figure
even higher in the last three years. By contrast, U.S. ship
days in the Pacific declined from 62,400 in 1969 to 17,150
in 1979 [Ref 49: p. 16]. The increase in Soviet operations
in the South China Sea indicates a willingness on the part of
the Soviets to "show the flag" and counteract U.S. naval
deployments in the same region.
Conclusions about the implications of the future Soviet
military posture can be reached after the reaction of Southeast
Asian and the other nations which have military, diplomatic
and economic interests in Southeast Asia are considered.
IV. REGIONAL POLITICAL REACTIONS TO SOVIET INFLUENCE
BUILDING THROUGH THE USE OF MILITARY PRESENCE AND ASSISTANCE
Since the Soviet Union relies mainly on its military
assistance programs and deployed forces in its attempt to
build lasting influence in Southeast Asia, a look at regional
reactions to that effort is required. First I will look at
the ASEAN countries, followed by the countries of Indochina,
the PRC , and finally Australia. Each of these countries has
an interest in the status of Soviet military forces in the
region (or the forces of its allies) because those forces may
be used to attempt to influence their actions . If the
conclusion is that the reaction of the regional actors is
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negative, there is less likelihood that Soviet military
assistance and armed forces can help build lasting influence
A. THE ASEAN REACTION
In the view of the ASEAN states, initial Soviet attempts
to build influence through the use of military means in
Southeast Asia was a 1969 proposal by Leonid Brezhnev for an
Asian "collective security" system. Although there were no
specifics spelled out in the Brezhnev proposal, it seems
clear that the idea behind the proposal was a system which
implied the use of the Soviet military to guarantee the peace
in Asia. This assumed an exclusion of both the U. S. and the
PRC . As a noted authority on the Soviet Union in Asia, B. Sen
Gupta has put it
,
When Brezhnev put forward, in the most cryptic manner,
his idea of a collective security system in Asia, his
Asian vision must have been dominated by his perceptions
of a United States about to retreat from Southeast
Asia and a China that had to be militarily subdued and
diplomatically isolated. He put forth his proposal for
collective Asian security as a replacement of the U.S.
security system. In this, the very concept was the
projection of the Soviet Union as the other power, which
had a better, more durable, and more acceptable security
system to offer the Asian nations [Ref. 58: p. 78].
There was little appeal for this or subsequent Soviet
calls for a Soviet led collective security system in
Southeast Asia. In November, 1971, ASEAN proposed an
alternative to this security system when it called for the
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creation of a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAM)
in Southeast Asia. The ZOPFAN would create a region free
from the influence of any great powers. At first, the Soviets
felt that this ZOPFAN dovetailed neatly into their call for
collective security as it called for the elimination of U.S.
and (potential) Chinese regional influence. However, in
spite of the call for ZOPFAN there were no moves by four of
the five the ASEAN states to disassociate themselves from
existing security ties to western states through the Manila
Pact and the Five Power Defense Arrangements [Ref. 25: p. 56].
In the early 70' s the Soviet proposals for collective
security received scant notice because relatively little
credence was given to the possibility that the USSR would
ever become an important power in Southeast Asia. Indeed,
...there was no clear vision of the USSR. It was neither
a enemy or a friend, an object of neither high praise of
bitter blame . The ideological image of the Soviet Union
had vanished; most people in the universities, in the
press, in business houses, and in government did not see
the USSR as interested in extending the frontiers of
world Communism. The Soviet Union was not even perceived
as overly interested in Communist victory in South
Vietnam. ... elite groups did not see the Soviet Union as
a credible candidate for power and influence in Southeast
Asia [Ref. 58: p. 209].
With the North Vietnamese victory in 1975, however, all
this changed. U.S. forces were less frequently seen as the
guarantee of stability and peace for the nations of Southeast
Asia. Thailand asked that U.S. forces be withdrawn and
together with the Philippines, asked that the Southeast Asian
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Treaty Organization be dismantled. It seemed that the Soviet
ambitions in the area had to be taken more seriously as the
United States' appeared as an unreliable bulwark against any
potential threats to regional security. More importantly,
the unification of North and South Vietnam into the SRV in
1976 demonstrated to ASEAN leaders that the USSR had a potential
opportunity to move its own power into the region. There
was even less of a chance for acceptance of the collective
security plan advanced by the Soviets because ASEAN states
saw a Soviet supported state as a potential threat.
By late 1976, the Soviets realized that their system
held no appeal for the ASEAN states and they assumed a
hostile line toward ASEAN, charging that it was little more
than a replacement for the now defunct SEATO, and a tool of
the U.S. imperialists [Ref. 18: p. 278]. The ASEAN states
came to realize that this call for collective security would
serve only as a legitimazation of Soviet power projection
into the region" [Ref. 23: p. 5 38]. This caused the ASEAN
states to dismiss the proposal for collective security in
spite of frequent attempts by the Soviets to persuade ASEAN
diplomats of the merits of the proposal during their visits
to the USSR. Since the late 70' s, the USSR has not raised
the issue of a Soviet led collective security system publicly.
The USSR, however, has not given up on its attempts to
use its military assistance or the implied use of its armed
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forces to attempt to build regional influence. Instead, it
has taken a different avenue. This is shown through its
support of the SRV invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, an
action that probably would not have been possible (or
sustainable) without Soviet support. Although ASEAN
condemnation has been less than unanimous since it first
took a stand in 1980, the current position seems to have the
full support of all ASEAN members. Meeting between 9-10
July, 1984, the ASEAN foreign ministers swiftly arrived at a
unanimous position which reaffirmed a 1983 call for phased
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and self
determination for the people. The foreign ministers went on
to condemn the Vietnamese harshly for their incursions into
Thailand and illegal occupation of Kampuchea. Finally, there
was an acceptance of full support for Thailand to protect
itself from Vietnamese aggression [Ref . 59: p. 32]. For the
present, ASEAN foreign ministers are strongly rejecting this
expansionist move by the SRV. This position brought an end
to the potentially divisive Indonesian attempts to single
handedly approach the Vietnamese through its commander of
armed forces General Benny Murdani . At the same time,
Indonesain attempts were rejected by Hanoi when it declared
that ASEAN could wait until "Vietnam's dommsday for a
(negotiated) settlement" [Ref. 60: p. 34].
The USSR has not been able to use military presence
anywhere outside of Indochina in order to gain influence.
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Of note, the most important peacetime influence building
role that the Soviets have for their navy, that of good will
visits to other nations
,
has not been evident in ASEAN
countries. There has not been a port call by a Soviet
combatant to an ASEAN country in the past 13 years. In fact
there have only been two such visits since the end of WW II
,
the last in 1971 by a destroyer to Singapore [Ref
.
58: pp.
546-547] and the other a five day port call to Indonesia by
several combatants in 1959. Furthermore, with the exception
of Soviet ultilization of Keppel Shipyard in Singapore
(access terminated in 1980), not even Soviet naval auxiliaries
have called in these nations [Ref. 22: pp. 209-214]. While
we can not be sure of the number of visits requested by the
Soviets, it seems clear that the total absence of such visits
indicates that the ASEAN countries want nothing to do with
the Soviet Navy.
In spite of general agreement by ASEAN to reject attempts
by the Soviet Union to build influence , there has not been
universal, direct criticism of the Soviet military
assistance to the SRV or the deployment of Soviet Naval units
to bases in Vietnam. The picture of the ASEAN response to
these moves is complex and deserves a country by country
examination simply because there is no overall position.
Due to its recent independence, the position of Brunei
can not be adequately examined. However, due to its long
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association with the United Kingdom, its strong attachment
to Islam, and the enormous per capita wealth which creates a
stable society, it can be assumed that it will be opposed to
Soviet activities in the region.
1 . The Indonesian Reaction
As pointed out earlier, Indonesia had first hand
experience in the mid-1960 's with Soviet attempts at
influence building through military assistance. The Soviet
effort was terminated soon after the abortive September 1965
coup. This was not to be the end of Soviet tries at making
inroads based on military needs of the USSR. By the 1970 T s,
the USSR began to see the strategic importance of Indonesia
as one of the countries that controlled passage through the
Strait of Malacca. With the need to have regular access to
its growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean, as well as
seeing other potential benefits (such as support for its
collective security plan etc.) the Soviets maintained a
tenuous military assistance program with Indonesia [Ref . 10
:
p. 426] .
As a result of the increasing importance of Indonesia's
strategic position, as well as a desire to reinstitute the
formerly close military relation between the two countries
,
Moscow offered a Treaty of Peace and Friendship to Jakarta
in 1972. The Indonesians rejected the offer and the USSR
commenced an anti-Indonesian press campaign [Ref. 25: p.
61]. Soon however, the Soviets tried another line to show
the Indonesians that they might be in need of Soviet
protection. Beginning in 1976, the USSR began a concerted
effort of playing on Indonesians fears of the PRC and the
overseas Chinese population within Indonesia [Ref . 25: p.
61]. This played on longstanding Indonesian anti-Chinese
sentiments (where the 2.5% Chinese population is perceived
as having been intimately involved in the 1965 problems as
well as being seen as have inordinate power for their size)
just at the time when other ASEAN states expressed concerns
about potential Soviet power moves into Indochina. This
Soviet propaganda effort directed Indonesian concern away
from the USSR and toward the PRC. This overshadowed what
little fear there was in Jakarta over the possibility of any
potential Soviet military threat in Southeast Asia by the
"Chinese threat".
Events in Indochina in 1978 and 1979 caused even the
Indonesians to reevaluate their position vis-a-vis the USSR.
The Soviet backed SRV invasion of Kampuchea and the
establishment of a permanent, substantial Soviet military
presence in the region probably caused enough concern that
the Indonesians supported early ASEAN calls for SRV
withdrawal from Kampuchea. Deeply rooted Indonesian fears of
the PRC (and potentially pro-PRC overseas Chinese in
Indonesia) and the possibility that it would become a power
in the Kampuchean resistance movement caused the Indonesians
to quickly return their focus to the Chinese question.
In fact, as early as 19.80, the Indonesians were thinking
of redefining the ASEAN position on Kampuchea. As they saw
it, having the Vietnamese in Kampuchea was better than
having the Chinese there [Ref . 61: p. 152]. Although this
position was not accepted by ASEAN, it reinforces the notion
that the Indonesians are much more wary of the potential PRC
threat than they are of the growing regional military power
of Moscow or its client states. This view seems to be
bolstered by less than vigorous condemnation of Soviet
military action in Afghanistan [Ref. 30: p. 14] and a mild
position of "regret" over the Soviet shoot down of KAL-007
when all others were issuing much more strongly worded
statements [Ref. 62: p. Nl].
Finally, the so called Murdani initiative of early 1984,
when the armed forces commander made trips to the SRV and
pointed out that the Chinese were the number one enemy,
again placed the Indonesians in a situation of seeming
unconcern for Soviet-Vietnamese regional military might
[Ref. 63: p. 8]. In the final analysis, the Indonesians are
not overly concerned with the projection of Soviet power
into Southeast Asia because they are much more concerned
with the potential PRC threat
.
2 . The Malaysian Reaction
Much of the concern evidenced in Indonesia over the
potential threat to Southeast Asia posed by the PRC is also
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seen in Malysia. This has not, however, prevented the
Malaysians from taking a unique view of the USSR. With the
Soviet call in the early '70 T s for a collective security plan
for Asia, Malaysian statements on the future of a two-tiered
neutralization system for the region (where each Superpower
would ensure that the others would not become militarily
involved in the area and the regional actors would all
become neutral) seemed to indicated that the USSR, along with
the U.S. and the PRC , could be guarantors of the peace. This
of course did not grant acceptance of the Soviet position
because it also called for U.S. and PRC participation, but it
seemed to permit a potential Soviet involvement.
As was the case with other Southeast Asian countries,
the Malaysian attitude toward regional Soviet military
presence and assistance changed when the SRV invaded
Kampuchea. A hardening of Malaysia's attitude was shown in
1980 when Malaysia proposed that there should be no Soviet
(or Chinese) involvement in Indochinese affairs. Maylaysia
went on to say that the SRV occupation of Kampuchea was
possible only with continuing Soviet military and economic
assistance [Ref. 61: p. 191].
Further Malaysian criticism was aimed directly at the
Soviet military presence early in 1981, when foreign minister
Shafie expressed fears that Soviet Navy use of naval
facilities in the SRV posed the possibility of increased
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Finally, another telling sign of Moscow's real committment
to the North was shown by their meager reaction to the mining
of Haiphong harbor. To show solidarity with their socialist
brothers , the USSR deployed six surface ships and five
submarines to the South China Sea to counter the U.S. force
of six carrier battle groups and over 1,000 carier and land
based aircraft. The smallness of the effort was shown when
the Soviet naval forces failed to approach closer than 300nm
to the U.S. forces [Ref. 12: p. 134].
Thus the North Vietnamese were under no illusions as to
the place they played in the global game. After their final
victory over the South they showed little inclination to
invite further Soviet involvement in the (by then) SRV. They
saw that the USSR viewed the war as an "almost ideal
arrangement" where they could directly contribute to the war
against the United States yet remain an adversary not a
combatant [Ref. 13: p. 254]. Following the end of the war,
the Vietnamese were able to "resist" Soviet efforts to
establish greater military and economic ties for some time
[Ref. 14: p. 64]. However, the Vietnamese could only hold
out for less than three years. By the end of 1978 they moved
much closer to Moscow due to their looming conflict with China,
their war in Kampuchea, and their failing economy [Ref. 15:
pp. 89-90].
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foreign intervention in regional affairs [Ref. 64: p. 01].
Similar sentiments were again expressed concerning Vietnamese
statements that they would leave the door open for Soviet
military bases. The Malaysians claimed that this was opposed to
the concept of the ZOPFAN and could only turn Southeast Asia
into a theater for war or nuclear conflict [Ref. 65: p. 05].
This position was given additional weight in March 1983
when, in a lengthy discourse on the current situation in
Southeast Asia, the foreign minister detailed the Soviet
military buildup in the area claiming that it "stoked
Vietnam's ambition which in the end would only serve Soviet
designs" [Ref. 66: p. 84]. A final concern was voiced in
April 1983 when Soviet deputy foreign minister Mikhail
Kapista raised the spectre of Vietnamese subversion in
Southeast Asia, endangering the infrastructure of all ASEAN
nations. The Malaysian Premier denounced this as a Soviet
"excuse to move into the region" [Ref. 28: p. 331].
It seems that this relatively hard line toward the Soviet
military presence in Southeast Asia and its military assistance
to the SRV began to soften by the summer of 1983. By then,
the foreign minister stated that the USSR was not a direct
threat to the region, but could cause a Chinese countermove
[Ref. 42: p. 24]. Thus the age old Malaysian view of the
Chinese as the potential begeyman seemed to be replacing the
Soviets as the foremost potential threat in the minds of the
Malaysians. Prime Minister Mahathir stated this view to U.S.
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Secreatary of State Schultz in July 1984 when he said that
Malaysia considered China, not the Soviet Union as the long
term threat to peace in Southeast Asia [Ref. 67: p. 2]. A
graphic illustration of this change in heart was demonstrated
by the announcement that the acting chief of the Malaysian
air force would travel to the USSR in September to look into
the possibility of purchasing Soviet military helicopters
[Ref. 68: p. 11].
Therefore, events surrounding the Vietnamese invasion
and occupation and the buildup of Soviet naval forces in the
SRV caused the Malaysians to see the Soviets (or their allies)
as the principal potential threat to peace in Southeast Asia.
However, time has acted in favor of the Soviets, allowing the
Malaysians to forget about them and remember the much more
deeply seated fear of the Chinese. This is not to say,
however, that the Malaysians now welcome Soviet presence in
Southeast Asia or its military support of the SRV.
3 . The Philippine Reaction
The Philippines say less about the Soviet military
presence and military assistance to Indochina than other
regional actors. This is easily understood as the government
of the Philippines has tremendous internal problems which
assume a much higher priority than responding to Soviet
activities. Several points, however, do bear mentioning.
5.0
First, the Republic of the Philippines joined the ASEAN
call for a ZOPFAN, indicating a refusal to accept the Soviet
attempt to enter into a collective security arrangement with
Southeast Asian nations. Furthermore, until 1975 the
Philippines was a member of SEATO and still maintains defense
links to the U.S. through the Manila Pact and the presence
of U.S. forces on bases in the Philippines (bases which are
now under Philippine control and sovereignty)
.
However, following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and
the collapse of South Vietnam, the Philippines, along with
Thailand, called for the termination of SEATO, a treaty that
called for resistance to the spread of communism in Southeast
Asia. Also, in 1975 the Philippines established diplomatic
relations with the USSR and the (soon to be) SRV. More
importantly, the agreement on establishment of diplomatic
relations between the Filipinos and the Vietnamese stated
that the Filipinos would not allow the U.S. bases in the
Philippines to be used for hostile military actions against
any other nations in the region (the Vietnamese made the same
pledge) [Ref . 58: p. 233]. Thus the government of the
Philippines seemed to abondon its anti-Vietnamese and anti-
Soviet stance. It should be pointed out that these moves
may have been made in part to influcence the upcoming talks
between the Philippines and the U.S. on the status of U.S.
bases in the Philippines (the final outcome of which gave
sovereignty of the bases to the Philippines). President
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Marcos may have felt that his bargaining position would be
stronger if he showed some movement away from 100% reliance
on the U.S.
In any event, the U.S. military presence in the
Philippines was continued and little was made of the
diplomatic offensive of President Marcos toward communist
countries. Furthermore, in 1980 Marcos announced that he
would fight on the side of the Americans if a global war
were ever to break out [Ref .61: p. 229]. Again, however,
this statement should not be viewed as a denunciation of a
potential Soviet military threat but rather a statement by
Marcos to his American benefactors that he remained a worthy
recipient of U.S. military and economic assistance. In fact,
in 1983 [Ref. 69: p. P3] Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo
categorically stated that the Soviet Union posed no danger
to the Philippines . For a variety of reasons the Filipinos
are not overly concerned about the Soviet military presence
in Southeast or their support for the SRV.
4 . The Singaporean Reaction
The reaction of Singapore to Soviet military presence
in Southeast Asia has varied widely since the early 1970 T s.
Although Singapore did not accept the Soviet concept of a
Soviet controlled collective security plan for the area, Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew indicated that Singapore could play a
positive role in the regional expansion of the Soviet naval
5 2
operations. In a 1971 interview with the Los Angeles
Times he said
,
It is believed in Singapore that once Moscow develops
its naval strength from the eastern Mediterranean into
the Indian Ocean, the island city-state becomes a
natural choice as a warm water port for the Soviet
Indian Ocean fleet and the big Pacific fleet based at
Vladivostok [Ref. 58: pp. 243-244].
In fact Singapore granted access to the Soviet Navy as
naval auxiliaries began visits in 1970. By 1972 the level of
activity increased dramatically including stops of over two
weeks for repairs. This activity continued into 1980 with a
total of 5.078 ship days spent in Singapore, mostly for
repair periods . This provided an economic benefit for
Singapore (as outlined in chapter II) and also improved the
position of SOVPACFLT since it allowed them to maintain a
schedule of repairs which was impossible in the overcrowded
repair facilities in the Soviet Far East [Ref. 22: pp. 136-138]
It would appear, however, that the overriding reason for
the granting of access was not to help the Soviets in their
attempts to build influence in Southeast Asia. Rather, the
practical politicians in Singapore saw the economic benefits
of the port visits and went ahead with the program. In fact,
as early as 1973 Singapore showed it had no desire to allow
the Soviets to establish a continual naval patrol in the
area. In that year Lee called for a joint U.S., Japanese,
Australian and perhaps European naval task force to patrol
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Southeast Asian waters to promote the peaceful development
of the region and "offset the threat of the growing Soviet
Fleet" [Ref. 58: pp. 244-245]. Apparently Singapore felt
it could have its cake and eat it too.
As with other states, the Soviet backed SRV invasion
further hardened the attitude in Singapore towards Soviet
military presence in Southeast Asia. Beginning in 1979,
Singapore took the hardest line toward the invasion of any
of the ASEAN states [Ref. 70: p. 275] demanding SRV
withdrawal from Kampuchea. The following year Singapore
terminated Soviet access to its repair facilities at the
Keppel shipyard and stopped all port calls by Soviet naval
units. The strong stance against Soviet military involvment
in Southeast Asia was reinforced in 1981 when the second
Deputy Prime Minister, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, declared that
the Soviet Union was eventually going to use force to
convert Southeast Asia into a proxy for its global goals
[Ref. 71: p. 29]. The attacks against the Soviet Union
continue, indicating a consistent Singaporean public position
It appears that for the near term, Singapore will continue
to voice it s opposition to the expansion of Soviet military
power into Southeast Asia as well as its assistance to the
SRV.
5.4
5 . The Thai Reaction
Thailand also currently voices very strong opposition
to the Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia and its
military assistance to the SRV . This has not always been the
case, however. Prior to 1373 the Thai military regimes had
little or no contact with the USSR and fought in South
Vietnam against Moscow's socialist brothers, the North
Vietnamese. With the fall of the Thai military regime in
1373, the Thais pulled their troops out of South Vietnam and
improved their ties with the USSR. The Soviets must have
been pleasantly surprised to see this development [Ref. 25:
p. 58], Even the question of the increasing Soviet naval
presence in waters near Thailand seemed not to worry the
Thai government officals as they stated in 13 7 3 that the
USSR should have equal naval access to the sealanes in
Southeast Asia [Ref. 58: p. 223]. The seeming high point,
from the Soviet point of view, came in 1376 when the Thai
government asked the United States to close down its
military facilities in Thailand and remove all of its troops
by March of that year.
This intelrlude of apparent acceptance of the Soviet
military presence in Southeast Asia came to an abrupt end in
1376 when a coup again brought the military to power in
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Thailand. The new government announced that U.S. military
aid was still welcome and within a matter of weeks was
involved in military border clashes with Soviet supported
Laotian forces [Ref. 25: p. 59]. Thai opposition to the
Soviet military activity in the area became more evident
following the SRV invasion of Kampuchea. Now the Thais were
faced with another hostile Soviet backed government on its
eastern borders as well as Vietnamese forces near the
border. Since the invasion, Thailand has been a leader in
the ASEAN calls for the removal of SRV forces form Kampuchea
and has taken a firm stand that the Soviet military presence
in the area is a threat to regional security.
Evidence of this stand was graphically shown in
November, 1980. The Thais were very upset that the Soveits
used portions of a then SRV deployed SOVPACELT task force to
put military pressure on Thailand for its leading role in
the ASEAN sponsored UN resolution calling for the removal of
SRV forces from Kampuchea. This task group, four combatants
led by CVHG Minsk
,
conducted operations close to Thailand
and reconnoitered Thai gas platforms farther out in the Gulf.
This action underlined the presence of Soviet military power
in the region, causing the Thai Foreign Ministry to lodge a
protest with the Soviet embassy [Ref .72: p. 559]. [Ref . 73
p. 11].
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The Thais continue to protest the Soviet military
presence and denounce its SRV alliance. On several
occasions SRV military forces have conducted incursions into
Thai territory causing combat with Thai troops. The most
recent action was in April, 1984 where the Vietnamese used
Soviet supplied T-54 tanks in their attack [Ref. 74: p. 10].
The Thais are also critical of the deployment of Soviet naval
forces on a seemingly permanent basis to the South China Sea.
The secretary general of the Thai National Security Council,
Prasong Sunsiri, has denounced the "massive" Soviet military
buildup as "Threat to regional security" which should be
dealt with by the United States, Japan or China [Ref. 74:
p. Jl]. In spite of this type of constant criticism from
Sunsiri and others the Soviets show no inclination to lessen
their support for the SRV or curtail their own military activity
in the region. As late as August, 1984 the Soviets conducted
aerial reconnaissance of the Gulf of Thailand with two Bear
aircraft to monitor U.S. and Thai forces conducting joint
operations in exercise Cobra Gold [Ref. 73: p. 11].
It is clear that the present attitude of the Thai
government toward the military presence of Soviet forces in
Southeast Asia as well as its military assistance to the SRV
is one of hostility. While it is possible that the Thai's
may come to accept the Soviet Navy in the region , it is
unlikely that the Soviet backed SRV occupation of Kampuchea
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will be acceptable, especially in light of continued SRV/Thai
border clashes.
6 . Summary
The current overall picture from the ASEAN nations is
not too bright for the USSR. Despite the fact that the
Indonesians and the Malaysians have Cat least temporarily)
ceased criticism of the Soviet military presence in
Southeast Asia, the Soviets still face harsh words from
Singapore and Thailand. Additionally, even Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines seem to be firmly behind the
latest, ASEAN position opposing the Soviet backed SRV
occupation of Kampuchea. Thus the only strong ally of the
USSR in the region remains an outcast, with the ASEAN
nations mindful that the SRV position in Kampuchea would not
be sustainable without Soviet aid.
The ability of the USSR to use its military force and
assistance as a tool to attempt influence building outside
of Indochina is poor. If anything, the Thai example shows
that the ASEAN members are very sensitive in a negative
fashion to this type of attempted influence building. This
is not to say that the Soviet military presence/assistance
influence building tool will always be rejected by these
nations. The future acceptance or continued rejection of




B. THE INDOCHINESE REACTION
Details of the pre-1978 relationship between the USSR
and Vietnam were given in Chapter II. In spite of massive
amounts of military aid given to the Vietnamese, the Soviets
did not appear to gain any substantial amount of internal
influence. Strains in the relationship between the two
countries showed that the Soviet Navy was not even allowed
to make port calls in Vietnam until just before the Chinese
invaded Vietnam. In short, for all of their effort in
support of the North Vietnamese war against the South and
its American ally, the Soviets gained little influence in
the region.
With the departure of the United States from Vietnam and
the victory of the North Vietnamese , the Soviets sensed that
there would be a future opportunity to gain influence in the
SRV . In this vein, they cancelled all pre-1976 debts that
the Vietnamese accrued in the war with the United States
[Ref. 75: p. 51]. Additionally, as tensions increased alonj
the Sino-Vietnamese borders and the as the Vietnamese were
preparing to invade Kampuchea, Moscow provided significant
increases in military aid to the SRV. Military transfers
amounted to only $23 million in 1977, increased to $97
million in 1978 and leaped to $1.1 billion in 1979, the year
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the PRC invaded the SRV. Aid remains fairly close to that
level [Ref. 76: p. 114]. Since the 1976 debt cancellation
the Vietnamese are paying for at least some of the arms that
they receive with cash and barter arrangements of light
industrial goods and some agricultural commodities [Ref. 34:
p. 14]. The amount of military assistance being sent to
the SRV, along with the 1979 Soviet naval show of force
during the Chinese invasion, affords some internal influence
and has gained access for the Soviet Union to SRV port
facilities
.
It appears that the increased interaction between the
USSR and the SRV is borne of SRV necessity to face its enemy
to the north and maintain its military occupation of
Kampuchea. The military establishment of the SRV is
completely dependent on Soviet largesse and the SRV military
leadership is acutely aware of this dependence. While
acknowledging the need for the dependence, many question the
closeness of the relationship with the USSR [Ref. 77: p. 16]
Beside the fact of necessity, there is another reason why
the Vietnamese are able to maintain a working military
relationship with the USSR, a deeply rooted respect for
power. As Douglas Pike has said,
Those Vietnamese who think about the matter are
extremely hard-nosed about the USSR. They regard
it as a nation with immense military capability
for intruding where it sees an opportunity for
advancing what it considers to be progressive
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or revolutionary movements . That drive is not seen
as ideological, as many in the West would view it,
but at the proper use of raw power. The common
sense Vietnamese view is simple: if you have power
use it. The USSR is admired for its toughness in
dealing with other countries , the United States and
China particularly. Conversely, China and the United
States are held in contempt to the extent that
weakness is perceived [Ref. 13: p. 259],
The view of the USSR is schizophrenic, with admiration
on the one hand and fear of domination on the other hand.
The one thing that all must agree on, however, is that the
USSR has supplied the arms necessary for the Vietnamese
military to defeat the U.S., occupy Kampuchea, dominate Laos
and repulse the Chinese. The list of military equipment that
the USSR provided is very extensive and, in amount, reflects




MAJOR SOVIET SUPPLIED MILITARY ITEMS IN THE SRV ARMED FORCES
Information for table taken from Ref 78: p. 119
Army 1500 T-34/54/5 5/62 Main Battle Tanks
300 PT-76 Light Tanks
Navy 2 Petya class Frigates
8 Osa II Missile Attack Patrol Craft
3 Polnocny Amphibious Landing Ships
10 Mi-4 Search and Rescue Helos
Air Force Numerous MiG-15/17 Fighter Bombers




38 Mi-8 Helicopter Gunships
22 Mi-24 Helicopter Gunships
14 Ka-25 ASW helicopters
Numerous SA-2/3 Surface-to-air Missiles
While none of this material is of the most modern
generation of Soviet equipment, it matches the sophistication
of the equipment found in other regional armed forces. It
would seem certain that if the Chinese were to obtain more
modern equipment, the Soviets would supply equally
sophisticated equipment to the SRV. Therefore, there may be
complaints on the SRV side of the arms relationship about the
quality of the material sent, but its proven track record
against the U.S. and the PRC and the fact that it is as
modern as any likely adversary probably makes this a weak
argument in the eyes of the Soviets and many Vietnamese.
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It bears repetition that the most telling illustration
of the strength of the influence that this military
assistance relationship has had on the SRV is long term
Soviet naval utilization of the facilities at Cam Ranh Bay
and other ports. The Vietnamese have denied that there are
any Soviet bases in the SRV, but the pattern of usage would
seem to indicate otherwise, leaving the solution of the
question to the semanticists . In spite of these denials of
the bases, Hanoi has stated that in the name of self
defense , they retain the option of granting permanent bases
to the Soviets if they so desire [Ref. 79: p. 34].
In sum, while there may be grumbling on the part of the
SRV about the potential for Soviet domination and the
quality of assistance offered, the Soviet use of military
assistance to attempt internal influcence building has been
accepted by the Vietnamese. Furthermore, this military
assistance allows SOVPACFLT use of SRV ports on a continuing
basis. Curently, the Soviets must view their attempts at
influence building in Indochina with a degree of satisfaction
Whether the relationship they are building continues over
the long term is another thing altogether, and will be
addressed in Chapter VI.
Not much mention has been made here of the Soviet role
in Laos or the Vietnamese occupied areas of Kampuchea. As
pointed out in Chapter III, military assistance and military
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advisors are provided directly to both Laos and Kampuchea
and Soviet military delegations travel to those countries
frequently, some including very high ranking military
officials [Ref 80: p. 11]. Soviet attempts at building
influence in those countries through military assistance
must necessarily take a back seat to the SRV, whose presence
in those countries greatly overshadows that of the USSR
(There are approximately 40,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos
and 200,000 in Kampuchea [Ref. 19: p. 165]).
C. THE CHINESE REACTION
The reaction of the PRC to the increased Soviet military
presence and assistance to the SRV has been very strong.
Following the consolidation of North and South Vietnam into
the SRV, relations between the PRC and the countries of
Indochina were quite good. The PRC established aid programs
with Laos, Kampuchea and the SRV. Also, there was no public
criticism of the small amounts of military aid that the USSR
was sending to the SRV [Ref. 27: p. 312]. With the
Vietnamese invasion into a nominally pro-China Kampuchea,
however, this cozy situation came to an end and the firm
objection to Soviet presence and assistance became the byword
of Sino-Soviet relations.
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Of course, this reaction was not warranted solely due to
the advantages gained by the 1979 Soviet advance into
Southeast Asia. The Sino-Soviet split of the 1960 T s foretold
that moves by the Soviets anywhere on the Chinese periphery
were bound to draw fire from the PRC . The situation in
Indochina, coupled with the two decade old Sino-Soviet
split, was reinforced by the 1979 Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. This led to a situation where the Chinese
claimed that the cessation of military assistance to the SRV
was a prerequisite for improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.
It is ironic, however, that were it not for the PRC
invasion of the SRV, the SRV naval bases would be closed to
the Soviets. It is also arguable that without the increases
in Soviet military assistance the Vietnamese could not have
attacked and occupied Kampuchea and the Chinese invasion
would never have taken place. As in most international
conflicts each side blames the other for the problem. In
the final analysis, the reponsiblility for the current
Southeast Asian situation can be placed on the SRV and its
Soviet ally. In any event, when the two communist giants
tried to reconcile their differences in talks in 1980, the
Chinese stated that USSR would have to withdraw its forces
from the SRV before talks could go on [Ref. 80: p. 144],
clearly rejecting the Soviet use of its military presence




The Chinese continued this attitude through mid-1982 as
they rejected Soviet overtures to improve relations. (The
Soviets made the overture in the face of Chinese/American
difficulties over the question of arms sales to Taiwan) . The
Chinese tied the rejection of the Soviet feeler to the
continued military buildup of the USSR in the Far East and
"consistent support for a Vietnamese controlled Indochina "
[Ref. 81: p. 10]. As is the case in nearly all international
dealings it was not long before the Chinese position would
seemingly change, to one more favorable to the Soviet
position in Southeast Asia.
Later in 1982 the apparent Chinese rejection of the
Brezhnev overtures was softened somewhat as the PRC conveyed
to the Soviets their feeling that the Soviet bases in the
SRV were not aimed at China but rather were there to counter
the U.S. bases in the Philippines. The Chinese concluded by
saying that they could accept some Soviet military presence
in Vietnam [Ref. 82: p. 14], Indeed, there seemed to a
meaningful toning down of Chinese criticism of the USSR/SRV
relationship through late 1983.
Just as they changed their position in late 1982, the
Chinese have apparently switched back to the offensive
against the USSR in Southeast Asia. In November, the USSR
increased the capability of their forces in Vietnam by
deploying surface-to-air missile capable TU-61 Badgers to
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the SRV. In response to this move, the PRC stepped up its
operations along the Sino-Vietnamese border and even sent Hu
Yaobang on a highly visible trip to the border area where he
urged the Chinese troops to be ready to face the Vietnamese
[Ref. 83: p. 46].
To make matters worse, in early April, the Soviets and
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the Vietnamese conducted a joint amphibious operation in the
Gulf of Tonkin . The apparent Chinese response was a renewal
of cross border attacks on Vietnamese troops on 28 April.
The PRC followed these attacks with a heavily publicized
amphibious operation on Hainan Island [Ref. 84: p. 47].
Additionally, the media campaign aimed at the Soviet
presence was also resurrected in 1984 when the Chinese
declared that the "Vietnamese-Soviet strategic alliance"
was being used by the Soviets to "gain a foothold and advance
base in its southward strategy" [Ref. 85: p. 24].
The conclusion to be reached from the dynamic Chinese
position toward the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia is
that it is inseperable from the entirety of Sino-Soviet
relations. As long as the Soviets maintain massive numbers
of troops along the northern Chinese borders and continue to
occupy Afghanistan, there is little chance that the two
countries will come to any overall understanding regardless
of the situation in Southeast Asia. It is important to see,
however, that the deployment of a capable Soviet offensive
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military force to Vietnam and continued Soviet support for
the armed forces of the SRV reinforces the conflict between
Moscow and Beijing. Therefore, Beijing is not ready to
accept the Soviet position in Southeast Asia without major
concessions in other areas (.which are not likely forthcoming)
,
especially since the Soviets continue to strengthen their
forces in the SRV.
D. THE AUSTRALIAN REACTION
Australian reaction to the Soviet presence in Southeast
Asia must be seen in the light of recent Australian
attitudes toward the Soviet Union's general military
buildup. Australian governments of the mid-1970' s tended to
be more wary of the USSR than were their American
counterparts. Indeed, in 1976, Prime Minister Malcom Fraser
claimed that the Soviet Union was seeking to "expand its
influence throughout the world in order to achieve Soviet
primacy" [Ref. 86: p. 145]. Needless to say such a
statement was not to be heard coming from the leaders of the
U.S. government who were still pursuing a policy of detente.
In a trend similar to that witnessed in the United States
with the election of Ronald Reagan, the Australian position
hardened even further as Mr. Fraser publicly warned the
Europeans of the "Soviet Bear" and went so far as to say
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that war could come with as little as three days warning
[Ref . 96: p. 146]. Unlike Mr. Reagan, however, Mr. Fraser's
party won only a slim majority in the 1980 elections and
later toned down their anti-Soviet stance. By 1981, a Joint
Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs concluded that
there was little likelihood that there would be any direct
attack by the Soviets against Australia [Ref. 86: p. 149].
Australian government views of the Soviet threat were further
scaled down after the Labor Party elected new leadership in
1983 as Bob Hawke became Prime Minister.
In spite of the lessening of the rhetoric, however,
there is still a view in Australia that the rapid buildup of
USSR forces in the Pacific Theater creates an increasing
Soviet capacity to intervene in third world situations
.
This capacity (or the capacity to aid allies in intervention)
was seen by the Australians as central to the Kampuchean
invasion, reinforcing popularly held suspicions of the
Soviet Union [Ref. 87: p. 156].
In relation to the situation in Southeast Asia, the
Australians have shown a range of opinions concerning the
Soviet force buildup and its influence on the region. While
some have claimed that it poses a direct threat to Australia
and others say that it and others say that it only poses a
potential threat, all seem to agree that it is detrimental
to the security of Australia [Ref. 88: p. 44]. In this
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vein, the deployment of the previously mentioned Badgers and
the routine deployments of Kiev class aircraft carries to the
SRV causes the most concern, as each can pose a direct threat
to the northern portions of Australia. This concern was
highlighted when the second Kiev class unit joined SOVPACFLT
earlier this year. It was seen as increasing the capability
of the Soviets to develop their own "rapid deployment force",
potentially for use in Southeast Asia [Ref. 56: p. 8].
All of this has added significance to Australia because
it has formal military ties with Malaysia and Singapore
through the Five Power Defense Arrangements; Australia,
Malaysia, and Singapore see the Arrangements as important to
the security of Southeast Asia. This importance is
manifested in the presence of Royal Australian Air Force
units at Butterworth Airfield in Malaysia. Early this year
the Australian government announced the withdrawal of the
forces but a review of the role of the force, and the desire
of Malaysia and Singapore to see it remain, caused the
Australians to leave it in place. This importance was
concretely demonstrated when the Malysians told the
Australian Defense Minister that the force allowed them to
more adequately respond to the security dangers posed by
Vietnam to the region [Ref. 89: p. 28].
Thus, whether it is manifested through public opinion,
government statements or deployment of forces in Malaysia,
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the Australians have a fear of potential threat posed by
the Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia and its large
scale military assistance to its Indochinese allies.
Furthermore, as Soviet forces continue to grow in the region,
the Australian reaction is likely to become more negative.
E. CONCLUSION
The USSR has not been the beneficiary of favorable
political reaction to its use of military assistance and
military presence as influence builders in Southeast Asia.
While the Indonesians and the Malaysians may see the Chinese
as a greater potential threat, the USSR is still viewed with
at least some suspicion. The remainder of ASEAN sees the
Soviet Union, to a lesser or greater extent, as a potential
threat because of its backing of the SRV . The Indochinese
states grudgingly accept the Soviet military presence but
would probably be happier if they could get Soviet assistance
without giving the USSR access to facilities in their
countries. The PRC is flatly opposed to the Soviet presence
in the region as well as the military assistance they give to
the Indochinese. Finally, the Australians would just as soon
see the Soviets depart the area. In sum, the balance sheet
for the USSR is not very favorable. It may be argued that they
lose more from their military presence/assistance to Indochina
vis-a-vis the regional actors than they gain in regional
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influence. The final conclusion, however, can only be
evaluated after consideration of the gains/losses in the
Soviet relationship with the United States.
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V. SOVIET - AMERICAN INTERACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The central reason for interest in the role of the
Soviet military in Southeast Asia is its impact on U.S.
interests in the area. U.S. interests are long term, having
developed over the past 150. years. Since the middle of the
19th century, the United States has been closely involved in
the affairs of Asia. Now our interests and involvement in
the region are being challenged by the Soviet Union and an
examination of the U.S. response to the challenge must be
undertaken to see if we can limit the attempts of the Soviets
to build influence through military presence and military
assistance
.
A. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The first American interest in Asia was manifested by
entrepreneurs who were seeking economic gains in areas
unknown to most people in the United States. These adventurers
were closely followed by missionaries from all denominations
of U.S. churches whose goals were to bring salvation to the
"less fortunate souls" of the Orient. As the twin missions
of economic gain and provision for the salvation of the
Orientals became more widely supported in America, it was
not long unitl we determined that it was our burden to offer
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the "benefits" of Western civilization to the all we could
in the East.
Thus as the interests of Americans became the interests
of the United States. The turn of century saw the U.S.
become a colonial power in the Philippines and our close
association with the Far East was guaranteed well into the
future. As time progressed, the U.S. found few challenges
to our power in that region of the world. However, the
rising power of Imperial Japan soon challenged the United
States colonial seat of Asian power. After a costly
confrontation, lasting four years, the interregnum ended
with the United States of America being the preeminent
military power in Asia as well as wielding significant
regional political influence. This position of absolute
superiority did not last long. The end of WW II witnessed
the beginning of a steady, long term rise of Soviet military
power in Asia which would become a factor in Asian affairs,
as would the challenge of the newly established communist
government of China.
The course of USSR/US interaction in Asia since World
War II is generally broken down into four periods [Ref 4: pp
3-27]. Soviet-American relations during the first period,
following the conclusion of the war until early 1949, were
largely determined by the results of the Yalta Conference of
1945. At the conference the Allies established certain
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"spheres of influence" for the Soviets and the Americans in
the area. The Russian regained Sakhalin Island and the
Kurile Islands, obtained access to Manchurian railways and ports,
and became the predominant influence in the northern half of
a divided Korea. The U.S., on the other hand, was to occupy
Japan and Okinawa, retain power in the Philippines, and be
the major influence in the southern half of Korea. No
mention was made of Soviet presence or power outside of
Northeast Asia at that or any other wartime conference
[Ref 5]. This system remained intact through the 1945-1948
period primarily because the competitive attention of the
USSR and the U.S. was focused on problems arising in Europe;
the Soviets remained relatively very weak in comparison to
the U.S. in Northeast Asia; and Southeast Asia was still the
concern of the prewar colonial powers.
In the second period, 1949-1965, events took place
between mid-1949 and 1950 which changed the tenor of the
regional situation, leading to a deterioration of the status
quo and confrontation between the USSR and the U.S. which
would persist throughout the period. Five specific events
were the catalysts to the increase of tensions in Asia: the
final victory of the communists over the nationalists in the
Chinese Civil War in 1949; the explosion of an atomic weapon
by the Russians in 1949; the beginning of the Korean War in
1950; the demise of European colonial power in Southeast
Asia (largely completed by 1959 when Singapore was granted
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independence); and the beginning of (indirect) U.S.
involvement in Indochina. These events also marked a period
of heightened tensions between the U.S. and China (viewed as in
part of a monolithic Soviet led anti-American communist bloc)
which would last until approximately 1966 and would be
concurrent with a corresponding deterioration of U.S. /USSR
relations. Compounding this deterioration was the beginning
of the large scale U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and
the British announcement of the gradual termination of their
presence east of Suez. However, the U.S. still felt that it
was the predominant determinant of events in the area because
it retained overwhelming regional military superiority over
the Soviet Union.
Relations during the third period, 1966-1978, were
marked by a series of ups and downs brought on by events
prompted mainly by U.S. and Soviet relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Relations between the two superpowers
were very hostile as this period began. However, the
deepening Sino-Soviet rift would provide an incentive for
Moscow to seek a reduction in tensions with the United States.
1966 marked the beginning of the large scale Soviet troop and
arms buildup along the Sino/Soviet border as well as the
commencement of a naval buildup of the Soviet Pacific Fleet
in response to deteriorating relations between the PRC and
Russia. For example, there were 20 ground divisions and 300
tactical aircraft among the Soviet forces in the Far East in
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1965, which by 1983 had been increased to approximately 50
divisions of ground troops and 1,200 tactical aircraft,
approximately 500 air defense interceptors, and 40 Backfire
aircraft. As will be seen in great detail later in the paper,
naval forces grew by over 25 percent during the same time
[Ref .6: pp. 51-52] .
The Sino/Soviet rift tended to lessen the tension
between the USSR and the U.S. as the Soviets attempted to
isolate the Chinese. This situation, along with other
events, eventually led to the doctrine of detente. However,
large scale border clashes between the Soviet Union and the
PRC accelerated the buildup of Soviet Forces in the Far
Eastern theater, and helped push the PRC closer to the
United States so that by 1969 the U.S. chose to play the
"China card" to further reduce tensions in the area.
Unfortunately, this move added to the Soviet fear of encircle-
ment in the region, prompting the Soviets to continue the policy
of military buildup.
Toward the middle of the 1966-78 period, U.S. military
power in the region faded rapidly after the withdrawal of
U.S. forces from Vietnam. As a case in point, the United
States withdrew approximately 25,000 troops and 350 aircraft
from Thailand alone after the North Vietnamese victory in
1975 [Ref. 7: p. 271].- Especially pertinent to the Soviets
in Southeast Asia was the highly visible worldwide reduction
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of U.S. naval strength, drastically reducing the primary and
traditional source of U.S. military strength in the region.
U.S. naval strength worldwide plummeted from 926 ships in
1969 to a low of 462 ships in 1979. Especially pleasing to
the Soviets was the removal of nine aircraft carriers and 99
surface combatants [Ref
.
8: p. 72]. These moves, coincident
with the Nixon Doctrine (stating that while we would supply
arms to our allies, they would have to fight their battles
with their own forces), clearly enhanced the Soviet military
position in Asia.
In fact, detente died a rather sudden death in 1978/1979
as the Carter administration watched the Soviet backed
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and came to the realization that their policies
toward the Russians were inadequate. This ushered in the
beginning of the foruth , and current period of U.S. -Soviet
relations in Asia. The new U.S. policy toward the Soviet
Union, combined with the signing of the peace treaty between
the Chinese and the Japanese and formal U.S. recognition of
the Peoples Republic of China, led to the latest (and
continuing) Soviet military buildup in the area. In effect
relations between the U.S. and the USSR returned to "cold
war" footing with each extremely wary of the other.
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B. CURRENT U.S. INTERESTS AND GOALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
This relatively new U.S. - Soviet interaction in Southeast
Asia highlights the basic conflict between the regional goals
of the USSR and the United States and Soviet attempts to
build influence to achieve their goals (at the expense of the
U.S.). Having outlined Soviet goals in the area, we now turn
to the interests and goals of the U.S. In dealing with the
USSR, the broad interests of the United States in Southeast
Asia are the same as they are in the rest of the world. As
Kegley and Wittkopf state in their book on American foreign
policy, American interests are threefold:
1. The United States must reject isolationism
permanently and susbtitute for it an active
responsibility for the direction of international
affairs. 2. Communism comprises the principal
danger in the world, and the United States must
use its power to combat the spread of this menace
.
3. Because the Soviet Union is the spearhead of
the communist challenge, American foreign policy
must be dedicated to the containment of Soviet
expansionism and influence [Ref. 90: p. 36].
These simple sounding yet important basic interests have
shaped American foreign policy in Asia since the end of WW
II. They have been concretely demonstrated through the
actions of every administration since 1945. Presidents
Truman and Eisehnower fought the Korean War in pursuit of
these interests. Four Presidents, beginning with Eisenhower,
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directly involved the U.S. in South Vietnam, conforming to this
basic theme of United States foreign policy. Finally, both
Presidents Carter and Regan followed the same basic thrust
through their commitments to Thailand in the face of the
challenge from the Vietnamese and through a buildup of U.S.
conventional weapons, especially naval forces, which are used
to counter Soviet force deployment in Southeast Asia.
These perceived interests have shaped the current foreign
policy of the United States in Southeast Asia. This foreign
policy hinges on five goals. First maintenance of U.S. naval
and air forces in the region, necessitating the pursuit of
strong allied support for these deployments stressing bilateral
ties with governments in the area. Second, maintaining
strong ties with ASEAN states. Third, making use of the "China
card" (to challenge Soviet power) by building stronger
economic and military ties with the PRC . Fourth, stressing
the need for the eventual rearmament of Japan's military
forces as a part of a burden sharing scheme. And last,
placing some stress (albeit rather weak at present) on human
rights [Ref. 9].
Our goals and policy obviously put us at odds with
Soviet goals in the area. While it is evident that the
United States has not achieved all of its goals in Southeast
Asia, it is striving to do so. It has remained committed to_
an active role in the area but has not stopped the spread of
8 0.
communism nor has it prevented the movement of Soviet forces
into the area. The failure to stop the spread of communism
and contain the Soviet Union can be directly related to the
failure in Vietnam. That allowed Vietnam to hold sway over
the remainder of Indochina and eventually provide facilities
for SOVPACFLT at Cam Ranh. During the same time, the ability
of the United States to counter any Soviet military buildup
in the area was drastically impaired because of the rapid
decline in U.S. military strength in the area. Primarily,
this was because the U.S. Navy (by far the most important
component of U.S. regional power) was reduced by such large
numbers that it could no longer claim absolute superiority
over the growing strength of SOVPACFLT. Also the U.S. was
faced with the necessity of a committing more naval forces
to the Indian Ocean due to problems in Iran. The cumulative
effects of this reduction are shown below.
TABLE 4
Reductions of U.S. Pacific Fleet Force Structure.
Information for table taken from Ref 91: p. 136.
1965 1975 1982
SSBN 10 6
SSN/SS 44 35 47
CVN/CV 13 6 6
CGN/CG 13 15 14
DDG/DD 10 3 2 8 37*
FFG/FF 19 3 3 4 4*
Mine Warfare 41 9* 9'«
Amphibious 73 32 32
Auxiliary 127 60 54
* Includes Naval Reserve Force
C. THE MILITARY IMPACT OF SOVIET MILITARY GROWTH IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA ON THE UNITED STATES
The impact upon the United States of Soviet attempts to
build influence through military presence and assistance has
been mainly in area of regional military balance. As I have
already pointed out, the U.S. retains defense arrangements
through the Manila Pact with Thailand and the Philippines and
that agreement has not been impaired by the Soviet presence.
Furthermore, the bilateral relations between the U.S. and
other regional nations remain fairly strong. The rapid
buildup of Soviet forces in Southeast Asia, however, has
changed the regional balance of power picture.
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The United States relies mainly on its naval forces to
provide regional security in Southeast Asia. The rapid
reduction in U.S. naval forces in the region coupled with
the rapid increase of SOVPACFLT forces in the area created
doubt about the U.S. ability to counter potential Soviet
moves
. This allows the USSR to use its naval forces more
advantageously to attempt to build regional influence
becuase they can now show an overextended U.S. Seventh Fleet
no longer has complete mastery of the South China Sea.
Unfortunately, this presents a challenge that we are hard
pressed to meet. An examination of the forces available to
each navy shows that there are areas where the Soviets have
significant numerical advantages over the U.S., specifically
in submarines. The overall balance between SOVPACFLT and
USPACFLT is shown below.
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TABLE 5
SOVPACFLT/USPACFLT Naval Balance in 1982.
Information for this table taken from Refs 94 and 95
USSR- U.S.**
24 SSBN 2












2 50 AIRCRAFT***** 75
* Includes ships in "mothballs".
** Does not include ships in "mothballs" or in the Naval
Reserve Forces
.
*** Does not include the newly arrived CVGH
.
**** Excludes all ships of 2,000 tons displacement or less
***** Includes only fixed wing combat aircraft.
In short, the U.S. does not have enough naval forces to
go around. In fact, Admiral Robert Long, past Commander-in-
Chief United States Forces Pacific has said, "naval, air,
army, and marine forces in PACOM are thinly stretched trying
to cover the Pacific and Indian Oceans and Southeast Asian
waters" [Ref. 92: pp. 30-31]. Even more to the point,
former CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt says
,
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The U.S. Navy's position has deteriorated
dramatically during the last decade
,
to the
point that the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) declared in 1981 that the United
States has lost its 'narrow margin of
superiority, sliding into a gray area where
neither side can be said to be ahead.' I
believe that the situation is far worse
than that stated by the CNO, because (1)
the strategic nuclear relationship is more
advantageous to the Soviets at this time
than officially acknowledged, (2) the
Soviets are expanding their naval
capabilities at a rapid pace, and (3) the
current efforts to revitalize the (U.S.)
Navy are off course [Ref 93: p. 139],
Any final assessment of the ability of SOVPACFLT to
defeat USPACFLT in the South China sea is highly scenario
dependent. If both fleets were to mass their forces in the
region, the U.S. fleet would appear to be much stronger, if
we were able to locate and neutralize their submarines
rapidly. However, it is unlikely that such an engagement
would ever take place. Most of the naval action in a war
between the USSR and the U.S. would take place in the North
Pacific. Therefore, each side would probably engage the
other in the South China Sea with forces already in place.
Assuming the normal composition of Soviet forces in the
region as detailed in Table 2 and assuming that the U.S. had
the usual single carrier battle group in the South China sea
the results would vary. If the Soviets were able to strike
without warning, the U.S. task group would surely be
devastated if the Soviets used tactical nuclear weapons , and
would probably be heavily damaged if conventional weapons
were used. If the U.S. task group had ample warning time, a
conventional attack by the Soviets would do much less harm
and in fact the U.S. forces would probably "win" the battle.
However, even with ample warning, if they were the first to
use tactical nuclear weapons the U.S. forces could be
severely damaged.
The point to be made here is that, depending on the
scenario, USPACFLT could either win or lose an engagement
with SOVPACFLT. The most important fact remains, however,
that 15 years ago we could have won any engagement and, if
the Soviets are free to choose the scenario, the chances are
good that , we could "lose" some engagements which would take
place today. An in-depth study of the ability of the U.S.
fleet to receive ample warning time about an impending
Soviet attack is beyond the scope of thesis. In fact, in
most cases the USPACFLT would receive warning before an
attack took place. However, it is my opinion that there are
instances when a surprise attack could take place.
Regardless of the war fighting scenario, the Soviets can
more easily use their Navy as a tool to attempt influence
building than they could six years ago. As pointed out
earlier the shift in the balance of naval forces in the area
is clearly in the Soviet's favor. They went from practically
nothing in 1978 to a sizeable force in 1983. At the same
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time, the U.S. naval force in the area shrunk between 1969-
1978 and is only now being rebuilt (.but only to 60% of the
pre 1969 level). This has brought the nations of Indochina
to see the SOVPACFLT units as a credible power and may cause
at least the Malaysians and the Indonesians to see it as a
more reliable bulwark against potential Chinese aggression.
Furthermore, the Soviet forces in the SRV pose a direct
threat to the logistical support infrastructure that the
U.S. has in the Philippines, especially the American naval
base at Subic Bay. With the introduction of the TU-16 Badger
strike aircraft into Vietnam the Soviets have, for the first
time, placed our bases at risk by conventional air attack.
Prior to the Badger deployments to Cam Ranh , any conventional
air attack against these bases would have had to come from
the Soviet air bases in the Vladivostok area.
This, of course, would have meant that they would have
had to fly through areas strongly defended against such
actions by the U.S. Air Force in South Korea and Japan and
the Japanese air self defence forces. This would involve
approx 156 U.S. fighter aircraft (.36 F-4, 72 F-15, and 49
F-16) [Ref 33: p. 10] and 240 Japanese fighter aircraft
(130 F-4, 10 F-15 and 100 F-104) [Ref. 96: p. 36] before
they even were close to the Philippines. Now however, they
face only a total force in the Philippines of 2 U.S. Air
Force F-4 and 1F-5E squadrons [Ref. 33: p. 10] and 1 F-8
and 1 F-5A squadron of the Philippine Air Force and no
surface-toair missiles [Ref. 33: p. 98]. This argument,
of course, assumes a worst case scenario where U.S. carrier
borne aircraft were not put to use. If these aircraft were
used, it would normally add two squadrons of F-14 aircraft
to the forces available as well as the use of the E-2C
airborne early warning platform to the scenario and would
make the task of the Badgers more difficult.
The impact on the regional balance by the Badgers alone
can easily be seen and marks a tremendous increase over just
one year ago. While the threat of the other portions of the
Soviet SRV based complement are not so dramatic, they do
still pose a significant threat to U.S. naval forces
operating in the South China Sea. Surface and airborne ASW
assets (although limited in size) are now locally available
and an adequate ACW force is easily assembled with the cruise
missile firing submarine, the surface combatants, the
Badgers and the Bear D reconnaissance aircraft.
These forces also pose a tremendous threat to the use of
the sea lines of communications which pass through the South
China Sea. These lines of communication are vital to the
economy of nations littoral to the South China Sea and
relatively important to the economy of Japan, the linchpin
of U.S. foreign policy in Northeast Asia. Thus the denial of
the South China Sea for shipping would immediately affect
the economy of the entire Pacific basin, and although some
compensation could be made for nations outside of the South
China Sea by rerouting shipping traffic, the results would
still be grave
.
Similarly, these units are now in a position to pose a
threat to the ability of the United States to have free use
of the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca to rapidly
resupply forces in the Indian Ocean in time of conflict with
stocks on hand at Subic Bay. In fact these large, important
forward based stocks may be destroyed by direct air or sea
launched cruise missile attacks. The destruction of the
forward based supplies would be devastating to the Seventh
Fleet and would also force the U.S. to ressuply its naval
forces from the Marianas or Hawaii, creating delay in a time
critical situation.
In quantitative and qualitative terms, the change in the
regional U.S. - Soviet military balance has been greater in
the past five years than in any other geographic area.
Clearly this has aided in Soviet attempts to use military
forces and assistance as influence builders. They can show
that the U.S. is relatively much weaker than they were
before vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Additionally, the USSR
can point out that it now has forces in the area which could
be used if any Southeast Asian nation feels it is in need of
protection from it regional neighbors.
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This is not to say that the Soviets are on the verge of
replacing the United States as the most important power in
the region. We have already seen that the USSR is limited
in its attraction to the nations of the area in the economic,
cultural and diplomatic arenas. In fact, the general
disenchantment with the Soviets, combined with the attraction
of the United States as a role model have led the ruling
elites of the area to support a strong U.S. presence there.
Visists to the U.S. by the leaders of Indonesia, Singapore
and the Philippines in 1982, along with Singaporean and
especially Thai denunciations of the Soviet presence in
Southeast Asia have all resulted in calls from those leaders
for a stronger American security commitment to the defense
of its interents in the area [Ref. 97: pp. 18-19].
In spite of these calls for an increased U.S. presence,
and the fact that they are diplomatically inept and
economically weak, at the present time the Soviets must see
their efforts at influence building in Southeast Asia
through military power and assistance as being positive.
They have rapidly and radically changed the regional military
balance of power vis-a-vis the United States to a position
where the U.S. could find itself in a losing battle in the
event of a military engagement. The United States has seen
this change in balance and has taken concrete steps to lessen
Soviet gains.
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D. THE U.S . RESPONSE
The U.S. response to the Soviet attempts to build
influence through military presence and military assistance
to its allies is to strengthen its economic, diplomatic and
military posture in the region. Overall the United States,
realizing the strategic importance of Asia, is placing more
emphasis on the region in relation to our own long term
security. As Secretary of State Schultz said in an address
before the World Affairs Council in San Francisco on March,
5 1983,
... 2 days of meetings with our chiefs of missions
from all of the Asian Pacific area, underlined for
me the importance of this vibrant area for the
United States and for the World. The dynamism
that I saw convinces me that, as important as the
region is today, it will only be more important
tomorrow. Nothing underscores the direct
interest of the United States in this region more
than two simple facts. 1. We trade more today
with the nations of the Asian Pacific that with
any other region on earth. 2. We have fought
three wars in the Pacific in the last 40 years.
We do not want to fight another, and this is a
reason why the United States will continue to
maintain a presence there [Ref. 98],
1. The Economic and Diplomatic Response
Concrete steps have been taken in Southeast Asia to
bolster the American position since the Soviets came so
strongly on the scene in 1979. First, the United States
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maintains a program of economic assistance with nations in
the region to help them in their internal development as
well as to ensure friendly relations. In the 1979, the year
of the first massive Soviet aid infusions into Indochina,
the United States provided $29.1 million in direct economic
loans and grants to regional governments , the two largest
recipients being Indonesia and the Philippines. Another $241
million was provided to the region via loans from the U.S.
sponsored Improt - Export Bank [Ref . 99: pp. 73-82].
U.S. economic interests and business ties to the regions
were also strong. In 1979 the ASEAN countries formed an
important trading partnership with the U.S. with 18.6% of
ASEAN exports destined for America and 16.5% of its imports
derived from the U.S. [Ref. 21: p. 24]. American business
also had a strong direct investment in ASEAN countries
totaling approximately $3 billion [Ref. 21: p. 60].
The U.S. commitment in the economic aid and business
areas continued to grow after the end of the last decade.
Both the Carter and Reagan administrations cited the "USSR's
new strategic position in Southeast Asia to justify increases
economic aid" [Ref. 27: p. 307]. The business relationship
with the ASEAN nations also grew to the point that President
Reagan has said
,
The U.S. has very important economic and
security interests in Southeast Asia,
particularly the ASEAN countries. ASEAN
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as a group, is our fifth largest trading partner
and the site of some $10 billion in U.S. invest-
ments [Ref. 100: p. 34].
The second area where the United States has taken steps
to limit the potential for Soviet influence is in the
diplomatic arena. Here the U.S. has taken numerous steps to
cement our diplomatic dealings with the ASEAN countries
.
Recently appointed U.S. diplomats are "old Asia' hands who
show a good deal of understanding with the nations of
Southeast Asia. American political leaders made trips to the
region to show that their well being and security is a vital
part of the American interest. Finally the United States
allowed ASEAN totake the diplomatic lead the bring an end
to the SRV invasion and occupation of Kampuchea and placed
itself 100% behind that diplomatic effort [Ref. 100: p. 30].
In this vein, Secretary of State Schultz told the foreign
ministers of ASEAN, "We (the United States) are fully
committed to supporting the common goals in Southeast Asia
....we follow your lead" [Ref. 105: p. Jl]
.
2 . The Military Assistance and Military Presence
Response
The final area that the United States has
concentrated on to limit Soviet influence building is
military assistance programs and military presence.
Returning again to 1979, the United States concluded a
total of $150 million military assistance program (MAP)
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grants and loans with ASEAN countries (bringing the 1979
total to $637 million in direct economic and military grants
and loans). Additionally, $515 million worth of foreign
military sales (FMS) agreements were reached with ASEAN
countries in 1979. By 1983, MAP increased to $157 million
and FMS to $725 million, demonstrating increased U.S. concern
[Ref. 101: p. 3-51].
Another part of this response by the United States is to
seek limited burden sharing with allies and other friendly
governments. In fact, a readjustment of burden sharing with
the Japanese and to a lesser extent the Chinese is a keystone
for the Reagan administration's Asian policy. Frequent calls
for the rearming of Japan and calls for transfer of military
technology to China come from the President Reagan himself,
"The most important contribution Japan can make towards peace
and security in Asia is for Japan to provide for its own
defence (sic) and share more of the burden of our mutual
defence efforts" [Ref. 102: p. 14].
While this policy is certainly important in the context
of Japanese self defense and the containment of SOVPACFLT
units to the Sea of Japan, it should not be trumpeted as the
method to solve our problems in Southeast Asia. The leaders
of the states in that region are nearly unanimous in their
fear of a renewed Japanese defense buildup which could
extend to Southeast Asia. The memories of World War II are
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still too fresh for most of them and they would rather see
more U.S. involvement than Japanese presence. A very blunt
statement (but to the point) was made by President Ferdinand
Marcos when he traveled to the United States in September,
1983.
During his visit to the U.S. in mid-September,
Marcos told the Washington Post that he had
misgivings about the growing military relation-
ship with Japan. Tokyo, he said, still
harboured hopes of dominating Asia, first
economically and then either politically or
militarily. "If Japan is sold any of your arms,"
Marcos warned, "see that those arms are not used
for predatory purposes. I am distrustful of the
Japanese" [Ref. 103: p. 19].
Similarly, the Southeast Asians are wary of any attempt
by the United States to enhance the military capabilities
of the PRC. They feel that this would only lead to the
probability of conflict between the PRC and the USSR in
Southeast Asia as well as increase PRC support for insurgency
movements in the region [Ref. 104: pp. 29-30]. Additionally,
there is the age old fear in Southeast Asia of direct
military aggression by the PRC. The Chinese seizure of the
Paracel Islands in 1974 and perceived Chinese designs on the
Spratly's and the Natuna ' s , shows that this fear is not
ungrounded. For its part, the United States must pursue
the issue of burden sharing very cautiously, concentrating
on items that are defensive in nature for both the Japanese
and Chinese and will not be perceived as threat by the
Southeast Asians.
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Most importantly vis-a-vis the USSR, we have taken steps
to maintain our military strength in Southeast Asia. This is
the most important tool we have to limit the future impact
of the Soviet naval build up in Southeast Asia. To quote
from James A. Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
A strong and visible United States presence
continues to be essential throughout the
region to prevent intimidation of our
friends and allies and to assure those
nations who share our values of interests
that America's commitment to the region
remains firm. The renewed commitment of
the American Government and the American
people to do what it takes to ensure our
defense has started to make a difference
in the Pacific [Ref. 106: p. 21].
More precisely, the United States has to remain
committed to a regional defense that relies primarily on
naval power. It is not only Soviet admirals who recognize
the inherent advantages of naval power as a component of
foreign policy; the same feelings are true in a wide
spectrum of the U.S. academic world in regard to the Soviet
challenge in this regional setting. Michael Nacht has
argued
,
A related characteristic of American
regional security should be to increase




aircraft, and the use of conventionally
armed sea-launched cruise missiles.
Naval power is flexible. It can
be put in place and removed relatively
easily from a potential conflict
stiuation. If it is sensibly
deployed , it can be insulated from
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large numbers of politically vulnerable
basing arrangements. American naval
power can project a military presence
for political purposes of introduce
potent armed force into a conflict
without relying on the cooperation
of any other sovereign state [Ref. 107:
p. 262].
And even Selig Harrison, a critic of U.S. policy in
Asia has agreed that in the U.S. /USSR competition in Asia,
the power of the Seventh Fleet is the main tool for American
containment of Soviet expansionism [Ref. 100: p. 379].
Steps have been taken to bolster this main instrument of
response to Soviet influence building. In 1978 Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown dropped the so called "swing strategy"
which would have denuded Southeast Asia of U.S. naval power
in the event of a war in Europe. Furthermore, commitments
were made to strengthen the U.S. Seventh Fleet [Ref. 27:
p. 307]. In fact this had been done under the Reagan
administration. Major defense budget increases have
provided for a larger supply of ammunition for Seventh Fleet
units and a commitment has been made to increase the size of
the overall Navy to 600 ships, including 15 carrier battle
groups. This would make one more available for the Pacific.
Additionally the Navy's ship building program is replacing
older less capable platforms with newer, more capable ones.
For example, the continued construction of nuclear powered
aircraft carries has allowed the replacement of the WWII
vintage USS Coral Sea with the much more capable USS Carl
97
Vinson in the USPACFLT inventory. Admiral Sylvester R.
Foley Jr., Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, has said that
all of these changes are going to make Seventh Fleet more
capable of dealing with the Soviet presence in the South
China Sea [Ref. 109: p. 28].
We have seen that the increased Soviet military presence
in Southeast Asia changed the balance of power in the area
between the United States and the Soviet Union. This has
given the Soviets a better capability to attempt influence
building in the region. We have also seen that the United
States has taken economic, diplomatic and military steps to
respond to this challenge. Will the challenge be met?
The answer can only come after measuring the U.S. response in
combination with the response of the regional actors and
examining the likelihood that the Soviet presence in the SRV
will be secure in the future. The current and future success
of Soviet influence building attempts are assessed below.
9.8
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
I have viewed the Soviet presence in Southeast in light of
their desire to build lasting regional influence. Several
conclusions about that presence and the ability of the
Soviets to attain their goals in the region can be made.
First, the role of the Soviet military in Southeast Asia
is to build influence and help the USSR attain its foreign
policy goals in the area.
Second, Soviet non-military means of influence building
clearly play a secondary role to the tool of military
assistance and military presence. This has led the Soviets
to extend massive amounts of military aid to Indochina as
well as maintain a large naval presence in the South China
Sea, dependent upon bases in Vietnam. The Soviet Navy will
remain the most important facet of the Soviet military
presence in Southeast Asia and it will be improved qualita-
tively and may increase slightly in size.
Third, outside of Indochina the negative reaction to
the Soviet military assistance programs and deployment of
the Soviet Navy is greater than any positive reaction. Whether
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they fear the USSR directly or its Indochinese allies , all
countires which have interests in the region are at least
suspicious of Soviet actions and most are openly critical.
Fourth, because of conclusions two and three, it is
unlikely that the USSR will gain any lasting regional
influence outside of Indochina. Other than its military
prowess, the Soviets have nothing to offer most of the
nations of Southeast Asia, and that very same military
prowess worries them.
Fifth, it appears that the long term Soviet position in
the SRV is secure since the current relationship between the
USSR and the SRV will last well into the future. Indeed, two
of the foremost authorities on the Soviet position in Vietnam,
Douglas Pike [Ref. 13: p. 264] and Sheldon Simon [Ref. 27:
p. 313] have written that there is little reason for the
relationship to change much, given the SRV/PRC dispute, the
poor state of the SRV economy, and the strategic benefits for
the Soviets. In spite of the financial costs to the Soviets
and the feeling of the Vietnamese that the USSR is too visible
in the SRV, the benefits of the relationship outweigh the
costs for both sides.
Sixth, in spite of the overall inability to gain lasting
influence outside of Indochina, the Soviets have at least
partially achieved their foreign policy goals in the region.
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Viewing these goals one sees successes and failures.
1. Containment of the PRC : Soviet success achieved through
military assistance to Indochina and the forward basing of
its Navy in the SRV. The Soviets have strengthened their
position vis-a-vis the PRC. Soviet forces are now in place
to either attack the PRC if the need arises or to prevent
any PRC thrusts into Indochina.
2. Counter U.S. influence: Soviet success achieved through
a definite change in the U.S. /Soviet balance of power within
the region. Over the past five years the Soviets have built
a naval force capable of significant damage to U.S. 7th Fleet
units operating in the South China Sea as well as U.S.
facilities at Clark and Subic . The Soviets have, however,
failed to replace the U.S. as the most desirable guarantor
of the peace for the non-Indochinese nations of Southeast
Asia
.
3. Keep ASEAN from a pro-Western orientation: Soviet
failure to achieve this goal is highlighted by the continued
U.S. military presence in the Philippines, the continuance
of the Manila pact, the ongoing U.S. bilateral military
contacts with all members of ASEAN, and the vigorous health
of the Five Power Defense Arrangements. Additionally, the
economic ties of ASEAN continue to be focused on the United
States and Japan.
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4. Support of Soviet regional allies: Soviet success
demonstrated through aid to Indochina and assistance to the
SRV during the invasion and occupation of Kampuchea and the
PRC invasion of Vietnam.
Overall the balance sheet for the USSR in Southeast Asia
has its pluses and minuses. The Soviets, however, must view
their foothold in Indochina in a favorable light. They are
now able to directly challenge the U.S. military in Southeast
Asia and they have a direct "line of fire" to southern China.
Also they can hope their position vis-a-vis ASEAN might
change in the long run as members of ASEAN who fear the PRC
more than the USSR may come to feel that their best protection
from the Chinese threat is Soviet power. None of this was
true before 1979.
In the final analysis, all countries with interests in
Southeast Asian are looking at a Soviet presence which may
last well into the future. Unless another country can be
found to replace the Soviets as the benefactor of the SRV
(which is unlikely for a variety of reasons) there are long
term implications for the United States.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The ability of the USSR to at least partially attain their
goals in Southeast Asia through military assistance to
Indochina and deployment of naval forces to forward bases in
the SRV has three main implications for the United States
.
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First, the U.S. must remain active politically and
economically in the area. Our bilateral ties to the nations
of Southeast Asia must remain strong and any potential
problems rectified promptly. At the same time we should
continue to suport the Southeast Asians' attempts deal
with regional political problems under the auspices of ASEAN.
Whether or not we view the Association as the solution for
long term problems , there is no doubt that support for the
organization is better than seeing its demise. This is
especially true in dealing with the problem of Soviet support
for the SRV occupation of Kampuchea. This event has
strengthened ASEAN which has taken a strong stand against
Soviet support SRV aggression. These steps will continue
to show that the Southeast Asians have nothing to gain
economically or politically from close association with the
USSR.
Secondly, in our attempts to deal with the Soviet
military presence in Southeast Asia we must not be too
willing to present a strengthened Japan or PRC as a counter
to the USSR. As pointed out earlier the nations of the region
would not be happy to see an increase in the Japanese or
Chinese ability to project power into the area. Therefore
our pressure on the Japanese to increase their military
spending and our aid to the Chinese military must be strictly
limited to defensive capabilities such as air defense and
anti-submarine warfare.
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Finally, we must continue to improve our military ability
to meet the Soviet regional challenge. This can be done by
enhancing the defenses of Clark and Subic (introduction of
I-HAWK surface-to-air missiles, and replacement of the
current U.S. aircraft at Clark with F-15 Eagles) and by
making sure the Seventh Fleet is suitably equipped to deal
with the naval threat.
In order to insure that U.S. naval force can be used to
the appropriate manner to limit the impact of the SOVPACFLT
naval buildup on U.S. regional policy, there are specific
items which must be redressed within the USPACFLT structure
regardless of the rest of U.S. Asian policy. This is true
because if all other policy fails to allow the U.S. to
achieve the goals outlined earlier in the paper, the U.S.
naval forces in the area are our best defense against any
Soviet aggression. As noted in the Gorshkov statement
earlier, naval forces can be brought to bear with out the
permission of foreign governments unlike ground and air
forces stationed abroad, and in peace time they are the
least intrusive type of U.S. military force.
It is crystal clear that we must not let the Soviet
naval buildup in Southeast Asia limit our options in the
area. We must insure that our naval forces retain
superiority over their Soviet counterparts. For each new
carrier that is added to SOVPACFLT, we must strengthen our
10 u
fleet. This should be done by the addition of another
battle group to our surface fleet and the placement of
Harpoon and Tomahawk cruise missiles on all capable units.
Further, we must carefully study the future structure of
the USPACFLT, to insure the best mix of platforms to
specifically counter the SOVPACFLT threat.
Also, we must come to grips with the problems facing
our bases in the Philippines . It is not certain that they
will be allowed to remain in the future, regardless of the
political outcome when Marcos is gone . In the rather
unlikely event that we are told to leave
,
other plans must
be waiting to be put into action. Whether this would entail
moving the forces to Palau , Guam, Singapore or Japan is
beyond the discussion of this paper. However, the ability
to rapidly project U.S. naval power into Southeast Asia
must be maintained
.
Finally, we must be aware that even if the Soviets are
denied basing rights in the SRV in the future, they are
moving in the direction of attaining the ability to project
and sustain naval power into the region without the use of
those bases. The structure of SOVPACFLT is changing to
allow it to rely on its own "rapid deployment force" in the
not too distant future. While this force is currently
limited some capability does exist.
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The most recent and graphic indicator that SOVPACFLT is
moving in this direction as it applies to Southeast Asia was
the joint USSR/SRV amphibious warfare exercise conducted in
April of this year south of Haiphong. In the exercise, Kiev
class CVHG Minsk and an Ivan Rogov class LPD conducted
operations which placed at least 500 Soviet Naval Infantrymen
ashore along SRV beaches [Ref. 50: p. 26]. This exercise,
confirmed by the SRV, [Ref. 51: p. 8A] is significant in
that it is the first instance of a Soviet carrier
participating in amphibious operations outside of the USSR,
demonstrating further steps by the Soviets at power pro-
jection .
The operation followed by three years Zapad-81, a
combined fleet exercise held in the Baltic in the fall of
1981 which demonstrated the ability of the Soviet Fleet to
mass amphibious units from all fleets into a combined
exercise moving 5,000 - 6,000 men and 200 medium tanks for
a landing. This exercise demonstrates the ability to
conduct a similar operation elsewhere. And, as time goes
by and more carriers are added to the Pacific Fleet along
with more amphibious craft, a large scale operation such
as Zapad-81 could be conducted in Southeast Asia [Ref. 54:
pp. 109-119]. Thus in my opinion it is easy to see why
Norman Friedman has said, "The Soviet Fleet is in transition
from a defensive or near defensive role in the coastal and
10 6
'blue-belt' zones to a probable overseas intervention role"
[Ref. 47: p. 156].
The problems inherent in the U.S. /USSR interaction in
Southeast Asia are quite complex. However, if the United
States continues to place emphasis on the regional contain-
ment of the Soviet Union and reiterates that the area is
extremely important to our strategic security needs
,
it is
likely that American influence in the region will continue
to be predominant . This will make sure that the role of the
Soviet military never allows the USSR to fully realize its
regional foreign policy goals. And, while limited burden
sharing with other states in the region can lessen the
impact on U.S. citizens, we need to remember that we are
the only people with an absolutely overriding interest in
our long term security in the region!
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